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The Nanjing Massacre in China (December 1937-February 1938) and the Sook 
Ching Massacre (February 1942-March 1942) in Singapore were two major 
cases of Japanese atrocities against Chinese civilians during Japan’s Fifteen-
Year War in Asia-Pacific (1931-1945). Both massacres have formed a 
significant and inalienable part of the Chinese populace’s memories in the two 
predominantly ethnic Chinese countries since the war ended. However, 
Chinese civilians in China and Singapore have different popular memories of 
the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre respectively. This thesis 
thus seeks to assess the differences between Chinese popular memories of 
both massacres from 1945 to 2015, and account for these differences through 
the study of ethnic Chinese survivors’ autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, 
and published oral history interviews or testimonies. I shall also examine the 
extent to which the Chinese people in China and Singapore remember the 
Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre respectively during this 
period. I will further discuss the nature of the relationship between Chinese 
popular memories of each massacre and the corresponding official memories 
in China and Singapore. Moreover, I shall explore how and why China’s and 
Singapore’s domestic politics and foreign relations with Japan between 1945 
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION 
 
The names of Chinese persons, places, organisations, and terms used in this 
thesis are rendered in hanyu pinyin, such as Mao Zedong and Nanjing. 
However, for names that are not usually spelt in pinyin, their pinyin versions, 
whenever appropriate, will be placed in round brackets after their more 
commonly known forms in the English language. Examples include Chiang 
Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), Kuomintang (Guomindang), and Sook Ching (Suqing).   
 
The Japanese names of persons and places are written in the most commonly 
known form. However, macrons which indicate long vowels are omitted, like 
Koizumi Junichiro and Tokyo. 
 
The names of all Chinese and Japanese persons are spelt in the traditional 
order, with the family names (surnames) first, followed by their personal 
names. Exceptions are given to Chinese, Japanese, and Korean scholars and 
authors who prefer to reverse the order of their names in English language 
publications. 
 
With the exception of the names of scholars and research materials mentioned 
in the footnotes and bibliography, the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean 
characters for the names of selected historical persons, places, and terms 




My translations of the titles of Chinese language books and articles into the 
English language are placed in square brackets [  ], for instance, Wenshi Jiliao 
Xuanji [Selected Compilation of Literary and Historical Materials]. 
Nonetheless, commonly known English translations, or translations by 
scholars, of Chinese names, titles, and terms are placed in round brackets, such 
as guizi (devils) and Kempeitai (Japanese military police). Alternatively, 
Chinese names and terms are placed in round brackets besides the English 
translations, like Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao) and “century of humiliation 







Han Guanzhang was only ten years old in 1937 when the Japanese military 
invaded China’s national capital of Nanjing where he lived. Like many other 
residents in the city, he and his family fled their homes and sought refuge in a 
school. However, Japanese troops, whom Han labelled as “devils (guizi)”, 
stormed the school and brutally killed several refugees. He witnessed the cold-
blooded murders, and the images of mutilated and decomposing corpses were 
permanently etched in his mind. Han never forgave the Japanese and “hated 
them to the core (henzhi rugu)”.1 He gave this personal account of the Nanjing 
Massacre
2





The Japanese military carried out another bloodbath in Singapore, the Sook 
Ching (Suqing)
4
 Massacre (February 1942-March 1942), soon after the British 
forces on the island surrendered. A thirteen-year-old teenager, Lau Teng 
Chuan, recounted his wartime experiences in Singapore in his autobiography 
that was published in 2012.
5
 Unlike many unfortunate Chinese civilians who 
lost their lives during the massacre, Lau and his family were lucky to be 
                                                 
1 Han Guanzhang 韩贯章, “Han Guanzhang Zhengyan韩贯章证言 [Han Guanzhang’s Oral 
Testimony]”, in Qinhua Rijun Najing Datusha Xingcunzhe Zhengyan侵华日军南京大屠杀幸
存者证言 (A Collection of Survivors’ Testimony of the Nanjing Massacre), ed. Zhu 
Chengshan朱成山 (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe (Social Sciences Academic 
Press (China)), 2005), p. 24.  
2 It is known as Nanjing Datusha in the Chinese language. 
3 Han, “Han Guanzhang Zhengyan”, pp. 22-24. 
4 It literally means “cleansing”, “purging”, or “elimination through purification” in the 
Chinese language. In the Japanese language, it is called shukusei.  
5 Lau Teng Chuan, Lau Teng Chuan: Sportsman, Teacher, Sports Administrator (Singapore: 
Lau Teng Chuan, 2012), pp.  25-34. 
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spared from the ordeal. He did not mention that he personally witnessed the 
killings or saw the bodies of massacred victims. Though Lau acknowledged 
that the war brought suffering to the people of Singapore, he bore no enmity to 
the former aggressors whom he believed had repented after the war.
6
 He even 
praised his Japanese superiors, who employed him during the Japanese 
Occupation (1942-1945), as “humane and good” people.7 
 
The contrasts between Han’s and Lau’s accounts are striking. Yet they are 
representative of the respective Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing 
Massacre in China and the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore. This year, 2015, 
marks the seventieth anniversary of the end of Japan’s Fifteen-Year War in 
Asia-Pacific (1931-1945).
8
 During this long-drawn conflict, the Imperial 
Japanese Army invaded many territories and carried out various atrocities 
against unarmed civilians. The Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching 
Massacre were two major cases of such atrocities. The total numbers of 
Chinese civilians who died in both massacres remain disputed,
9
 but it is 
sufficient to state that thousands of them lost their lives. On the one hand, the 
people of China remember the Japanese atrocities even till today, seven 
decades after the war ended. The reluctance of Japan’s conservative Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) government to fully acknowledge the country’s 
wartime past has embedded these war memories and plagued Sino-Japanese 
relations. On the other hand, the people of Chinese descent in Singapore have 
                                                 
6 Ibid., pp.  28-30. 
7 Ibid., p. 34. 
8 The Fifteen-Year War encompassed Japan’s invasion of Manchuria (Manzhou) in 1931, the 
Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), and the Pacific War (1941-1945). The latter two 
wars were part of the Second World War in Asia-Pacific (1937-1945). 
9 See Chapter Two for the death toll figures of both massacres. 
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largely placed memories of the Sook Ching Massacre behind them, and 
Singapore’s bilateral ties with Japan are generally free from this historical 
burden.  Therefore, even though both China and Singapore are predominantly 
ethnic Chinese societies and had endured the brunt of Japanese war atrocities, 
why are their popular memories of the respective massacre so different, and 
how do both countries’ post-war relations with Japan shape these memories?  
 
Research Aims 
I aim to address four main issues in this thesis. My first two aims are about 
Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching 
Massacre. It should be noted that I restrict the term “massacre” to the murder 
and execution of unarmed civilians, and exclude cases of rape, pillage, and 
arson. Firstly, I shall examine, through the study of ethnic Chinese civilian 
survivors’ first-hand accounts, the extent to which the Chinese populace in 
China and Singapore remember the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching 
Massacre respectively between 1945 and 2015. These popular memories, 
which I will define in the Literature Review section below, are important as 
they contribute to the development of national consciousness and identity in 
both countries. In addition, I rely on first-hand accounts, including 
autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, and published oral history interviews 
or testimonies, because they are useful primary sources that embody these 
memories. While I have incorporated some psychological concepts and 
sociological theories to help me explain how massacre survivors remember the 
war, an in-depth study of how psychological and sociological phenomena like 
post-traumatic stress disorder or socio-economic background respectively 
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affect memory is not the main focus of my discussion which remains grounded 
in historical research.  
 
Secondly, I will compare Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre 
in China and those of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore by discussing 
their differences and analysing the reasons for these differences. Though 
numerous scholarly studies have examined the war memories, including 
popular memories, of the respective massacre in China and Singapore, 
academics have paid scant attention to the comparison of popular memories of 
both massacres. Nation-based war memories, for example in China,
10
 or 
region-based war memories, for instance in Southeast Asia,
11
 have 
traditionally been scholars’ primary concern. There is hence a need to adopt a 
comparative approach in order to broaden the study of war memories and view 
them from a transnational and trans-regional perspective. Chinese civilians 
were the main victims of Japanese belligerence, and both Nanjing and 
Singapore were cities with majority ethnic Chinese populations. Moreover, the 
Nanjing Massacre was emotionally connected to the Sook Ching Massacre in 
the minds of the Chinese living in British-ruled Singapore in 1942. Most of 
them were born in China and remained loyal to their ancestral homeland. 
Hence, they perceived the Japanese Occupation of Singapore as an extension 
of the war in China, and the Sook Ching Massacre reminded them of the 
Nanjing Massacre. The large numbers of victims involved in both massacres 
have also formed a significant and inalienable part of the war memories of the 
                                                 
10 See, for instance, Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in 
Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
11 For example, see Kevin Blackburn, and Karl Hack, War, Memory and the Making of 
Modern Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012). 
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Chinese populace in the two countries. It is thus important to compare Chinese 
popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in China and the Sook Ching 
Massacre in Singapore.  
 
My research, however, goes beyond the simple comparison of Chinese popular 
memories of both massacres. My next two aims will probe deeper by 
examining the relationship between these popular memories on the one hand 
and official memories, domestic politics and international relations of China 
and Singapore on the other hand. Thirdly, I shall explore the nature of the 
relationship between these popular memories and the corresponding official 
memories in China and Singapore.  Fourthly, I will assess how and why 
China’s and Singapore’s domestic politics and foreign relations with post-war 
Japan from 1945 to 2015 shape Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing 
Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre respectively. We need to understand 
that popular memories do not exist in isolation and are constantly being 
shaped by other factors in a society. The study of how Chinese popular 
memories of both massacres are shaped cannot be divorced from China’s and 
Singapore’s respective domestic politics and bilateral ties with post-war Japan. 
Moreover, it is imperative to recognise how the two countries’ official 
memories shape popular memories of the massacres. Therefore, this thesis 
analyses the shaping of Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre 
and the Sook Ching Massacre in the respective context of China’s and 
Singapore’s official memories, domestic politics and international relations. In 
this way, I aim to build on and contribute to the growing scholarship on war 





This section reviews the existing literature on the various topics that are 
related to my research. It will first examine how academics from various 
disciplines approach the study of memory, especially popular memories. It 
will then proceed to discuss recent scholarship on the use of memory in China 
and its relationship with Chinese domestic politics and nationalism, before 
narrowing down to an analysis of academic works on the history and 
historiography of the Nanjing Massacre. The review of the relevant literature 
on China will end with a study of current research on Sino-Japanese relations. 
This section will move on to assess how scholars approach the study of the 
history and memory of the Japanese Occupation and the Sook Ching Massacre 




In order to better appreciate the contents of massacre survivors’ 
autobiographies, memoirs, and other first-hand accounts, it is essential to 
understand how various disciplines approach the study of memory. Academic 
research on memory studies has proliferated over the decades, originating 
from psychology, before moving on to sociology, cultural studies, political 
science, and history. From a psychological perspective, Daniel L. Schacter 
explains how the brain remembers events and provides scientific reasons for 





 Sociologist Maurice Halbwachs argues that 
collective memories, which are shared within a society, influence individual 
memories. These collective memories are in turn, shaped by present needs and 
circumstances. In other words, the past is remembered from the lens of the 
present.
13
 Oral historian Valerie Raleigh Yow further classifies both popular 
memories and official memories as components of collective memories.
14
  
Most scholars now also understand memory as a multidimensional concept 
and acknowledge the importance of interdisciplinary research in this field. 
Through his study of lieux de memoire (sites of memory) in France, Pierre 
Nora asserts that history and memory are mutually complementary, rather than 
contradictory.
15
 Moreover, Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan incorporate 
historical, psychological, and sociological interpretations of memory to 
analyse the ways in which individuals and nations remember wars in the 
twentieth century.
16
 These scholarly works on memory studies equip me with 
important theories and concepts of memory which enable me to better 
understand Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook 
Ching Massacre through a multidisciplinary perspective. 
 
                                                 
12 Daniel L. Schacter, Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past (New York: 
Basic Books, 1996), and Daniel L. Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory: How the Mind 
Forgets and Remembers (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001). 
13 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. and trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 182-183. 
14 Valerie Raleigh Yow, Recording Oral History: A Guide for the Humanities and Social 
Sciences, 3rd ed. (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), pp. 59-60. 
15 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire”, Representations, 26 
(Spring 1989), pp. 7-24. See also Pierre Nora, Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, 
3 vols., ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman and trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996-1998).  
16 Jay Winter, and Emmanuel Sivan eds., War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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Different disciplines have adopted varying definitions of “popular 
memories”.17 Political scientist Rafi Nets-Zehngut categorises popular 
memories and official memories as part of collective memories. He states that 
popular memories can either be regarded as the collection of the memories of 
individuals in a group or society, or as the group’s shared memories of the past. 
To put it simply, popular memories include both individual memories and 
group memories. Nets-Zehngut also defines “official memories” as memories 
sanctioned by the state. They are reflected in government-controlled platforms, 
such as school history textbooks and public museum exhibitions which portray 
the past according to the state’s perspective. Thus, official memories are 
manipulated by the state to serve its own political agenda. Owing to the state’s 
preponderant influence, official memories shape popular memories and 
determine a country’s foreign relations, as we shall see in the case of popular 
memories of the respective massacre in China and Singapore and both states’ 
post-war ties with Japan.
18
 The left-leaning Popular Memory Group in Britain 
offers a more specific definition for the term “popular memory” which it 
introduced to academia in 1982. It defines “popular memories” as the 
memories of the working classes, women, and ethnic minorities whose voices 
are marginalised, but not necessarily suppressed, by the state’s historical 
narrative. These memories are critical of official memories, and they are 
usually found in platforms which the state might not have a strong influence in, 
                                                 
17 In this thesis, I have used the plural “popular memories”, rather than the singular “popular 
memory” which the scholars whom I have cited use. I prefer the term “popular memories” as 
the memories present among the Chinese masses in China and Singapore are multiple in 
numbers. Based on the same rationale, I choose to use the term “official memories”, instead of 
“official memory”, and “collective memories”, instead of “collective memory”.   
18 Rafi Nets-Zehngut, “The Israeli Army’s Official Memory of the 1948 Palestinian Exodus, 
1949-2004”, War in History, 22, 2 (April 2015), pp. 212-213. 
9 
 
such as oral history and autobiographies.
19
 Although cultural studies 
practitioner Tara Brabazon agrees with the Popular Memory Group’s 
definition of “popular memories”, she expands its definition by arguing that 
popular culture constitutes an integral part of popular memories. According to 
Brabazon, popular memories are not limited to oral history and 
autobiographies. They are also embodied in popular culture, such as songs and 
films, which should be examined when studying popular memories.
20
 
Nonetheless, historian Paul Cohen offers a more general definition of “popular 
memories”. Like Halbwachs and Nets-Zehngut, he contends that they are 
collective memories which are formed by and shared within a community or 
nation. These memories are adapted and reinforced by both the masses and the 
state to suit present needs, regardless of the factual accuracy of the historical 
events being remembered. Therefore, unlike the Popular Memory Group, 
Cohen believes that popular memories do not necessarily challenge official 




In this thesis, I shall adopt Nets-Zehgut’s and Cohen’s definitions of “popular 
memories”.  I agree with Nets-Zehgut that popular memories comprise the 
memories of individuals in a society, and in this case, the private 
remembrances of individual massacre survivors in China and Singapore. 
These memories are also retained in the familial realm as they are passed 
down from the survivors to their descendants. I also concur with Nets-Zehgut 
                                                 
19 Popular Memory Group, “Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method”, in Making Histories: 
Studies in History-writing and Politics, eds. Richard Johnson, Gregor McLennan, Bill 
Schwarz, and David Suttton (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982),  pp. 205-252. 
20 Tara Brabazon, From Revolution to Revelation: Generation X, Popular Memory and 
Cultural Studies (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 65-78. 
21 Paul Cohen, History and Popular Memory: The Power of Story in Moments of Crisis (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2014). 
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and Cohen that popular memories can be viewed as memories that are shared 
collectively by members in a society. For instance, memories of the Nanjing 
Massacre have become part of China’s collective consciousness that is shared 
within Chinese society, even though not every Chinese citizen today was born 
before the war or had lived in Nanjing. Moreover, I adopt Nets-Zehgut’s 
definition of “official memories”. I agree with him and Cohen that the 
distinction between official memories and popular memories is not clear-cut. 
As we shall see in China and Singapore, popular memories of the Nanjing 
Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre respectively do not always contradict 
the corresponding official memories. While I agree with Brabazon that the 
study of popular memories should include films and songs, they would 
unnecessarily broaden the scope of my research. In the interests of narrowing 
down my research area, I have decided to adapt the Popular Memory Group’s 
methodology of using first-hand accounts. However, instead of emphasising 
the use of oral history interviews which the Popular Memory Group advocates, 
I will utilise autobiographies, memoirs, and other written first-hand records 
which are largely representative of popular memories in both China and 
Singapore. 
     
China, the Nanjing Massacre, and China-Japan Relations 
Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre are a recent phenomenon 
which is deeply rooted in China’s domestic politics and Chinese nationalism. 
Peter Hays Gries argues that since the 1980s, the ruling Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) has been manipulating traumatic memories of Western and 
Japanese aggressions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to promote 
11 
 
Chinese nationalism among the masses. Chinese suffering and victimisation 
under foreign imperialism are key elements in the official memories of the 
“century of humiliation (bainian guochi)”. The CCP government wants its 
citizens, particularly the young, to remember these traumatic events, including 
the Nanjing Massacre, in order to inculcate a sense of patriotism among them 
as China regains its status as a world power after more than one hundred years 
of being weak and divided.
22
 Zheng Wang builds on Gries’ argument when he 
asserts that Chinese nationalism, based on official memories of the “century of 
humiliation”, has become the main ideology that legitimises the CCP’s 
authoritarian rule. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Marxism was discredited 
as the party’s guiding ideology following paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s 
economic reforms, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its 
communist empire in Eastern Europe. Thus, the CCP has to rely on 
nationalism to remain in power, despite retaining its nominally communist 
identity.
23
 In her study of post-war Sino-Japanese relations, Yinan He agrees 
with Gries and Wang that the Chinese leadership manipulates official 
memories of Japanese wartime invasion to promote Chinese nationalism 
which is in turn, used as a tool to exploit China’s bilateral relations with Japan 
for its own national interests.
24
 However, James Reilly partially disagrees with 
the above three scholars. He argues that although the Communist party-state 
promotes historical consciousness among the Chinese populace, such 
consciousness contributes to the rise of grassroots history activism and popular 
                                                 
22 Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004). 
23 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation. 
24 Yinan He, “Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and 




anti-Japanese nationalistic sentiments that are not state-orchestrated.
25
 
Therefore, recognising the reasons for the development of Chinese nationalism 
is crucial for my understanding on how it shapes popular memories of the 
Nanjing Massacre and China-Japan ties. 
 
Chinese official memories of the “century of humiliation” and the rise of 
Chinese nationalism in recent decades are intricately linked to state-sanctioned 
memories of the Nanjing Massacre. Much scholarly research has been 
conducted on the history of the Nanjing Massacre and its accompanying 
historical controversies.
26
 However, I am not concerned with the history and 
the historiography of the massacre. Instead, academic works on official 
memories of the atrocities are more relevant to my research. Daqing Yang and 
Takashi Yoshida, who are prominent historians of the Nanjing Massacre, 
argue that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been encouraging the 
remembrance of the massacre in museums and history textbooks to promote 
Chinese nationalism among the masses since the early 1980s. As the guardian 
of the country’s official memories, the CCP regime opened The Memorial 
Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders
27
 (thereafter, 
                                                 
25 James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan 
Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
26 For a standard history of the Nanjing Massacre, see Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shigao 
Bianweihui 侵华日军南京大屠杀史稿编委会 ed., Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shigao侵
华日军南京大屠杀史稿 (Draft Manuscript of the History Relating to the Horrible Massacre 
Committed by the Japanese Troops in Nanjing in December 1937) (Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji 
Chubanshe, 1997). For a balanced treatment of the various historical controversies 
surrounding the Nanjing Massacre, see Daqing Yang, “Convergence or Divergence? Recent 
Historical Writings on the Rape of Nanjing”, The American Historical Review, 104, 3 (June 
1999), pp. 842-865, Joshua A. Fogel ed., The Nanjing Massacre in History and 
Historiography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), and Li Fei Fei, Robert 
Sabella, and David Liu eds., Nanking 1937: Memory and Healing (Armonk, New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2002). 
27 This is the official English name of the museum. In the Chinese language, it is known as 
Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Yunan Tongbao Jinianguan. 
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the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall) in August 1985 and incorporated 
Chinese popular memories of the atrocities through the production of war 
films, and the publication of war survivors’ memoirs and oral history 
testimonies. The party-state’s historical narrative stresses Japan’s undeniable 
responsibility for the Nanjing Massacre, with the total death toll of 300,000 
Chinese victims becoming a symbolic figure that is deeply etched in the 
country’s official memories. State-endorsed memories of the massacre have 
become so rigid that Chinese citizens castigate alternative interpretations of 
the event.
28
 Notwithstanding Yang’s and Yoshida’s detailed analyses of the 
official memories of the Nanjing Massacre, they neglect the study of popular 
memories. There is a clear need to include Chinese popular memories of the 
Nanjing Massacre to understand the relationship between official memories 
and ordinary civilians’ remembrances of the atrocities. This is one of my 
research aims.  
 
The growth of Chinese nationalism and Chinese official memories of the 
Nanjing Massacre have a direct impact on China’s bilateral ties with Japan. 
The history of post-war Sino-Japanese relations is well-documented. 
Academics have contributed much to the study of both countries’ political and 
economic relations since 1945.
29
 Nonetheless, scholarly works that are most 
pertinent to my research are those on historical issues affecting China-Japan 
                                                 
28 Daqing Yang, “The Malleable and the Contested: The Nanjing Massacre in Postwar China 
and Japan”, in Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s), ed. T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. 
White, and Lisa Yoneyama (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 50-
86, and Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the “Rape of Nanking”: History and Memory in 
Japan, China, and the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
29 Akira Iriye, “Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945-90”, The China Quarterly, 124 China and 
Japan: History, Trends and Prospects (December 1990), pp. 624-638, and Yoshihide Soeya, 
Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
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ties, and the mutual images that the Chinese and Japanese have of each other 
which are linked to China’s war memories. In her research on PRC-Japan 
relations since the 1980s, Caroline Rose assesses why disagreements over 
interpretations of historical issues, such as the Nanjing Massacre, plague 
bilateral ties. She then examines the success of Sino-Japanese reconciliation in 
overcoming these disagreements.
30
 Likewise, Daqing Yang observes that the 
inability to reconcile their different memories and interpretations of the 
Nanjing Massacre prevent China and Japan from developing a closer 
relationship. He proposes that a common historical acknowledgement between 
both countries that Japanese soldiers committed large-scale atrocities against 
Chinese civilians in Nanjing would help to promote mutual understanding.
31
 
Furthermore, Allen S. Whiting analyses the development of positive and 
negative images which the Chinese and the Japanese people have of each other, 
and the impact of these images on bilateral relations. He concludes that 
negative images of Japan in China, which resulted from the war, are an 
obstacle to enhanced Sino-Japanese ties.
32
 In his study of China’s and Japan’s 
soft power, Jing Sun agrees with Whiting on the importance of images in 
China-Japan relations. However, he argues that both the Chinese and Japanese 
governments place more emphasis on cultivating positive images of each other 
to enhance diplomatic ties.
33
 Like Sun, Utpal Vyas focuses on Sino-Japanese 
soft power, but unlike Sun, he stresses the central roles of sub-state and non-
                                                 
30 Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the Future? (New 
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005). 
31 Daqing Yang, “The Nanjing Atrocity: Is Constructive Dialogue Possible?”, in Toward a 
History Beyond Borders: Contentious Issues in Sino-Japanese Relations, ed. Daqing Yang, Jie 
Liu, Hiroshi Mitani, and Andrew Gordon (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Asia Center, 2012), pp. 178-204. 
32 Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 
33 Jing Sun, Japan and China as Charm Rivals: Soft Power in Regional Diplomacy (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012). 
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state actors in boosting socio-cultural interactions between the PRC and 
Japan.
34
 This study will henceforth build on the above-mentioned works by 
providing additional insight into the ways and reasons in which China-Japan 
bilateral ties between 1945 and 2015 shape Chinese popular memories of the 
Nanjing Massacre.    
 
Singapore, the Sook Ching Massacre, and Singapore-Japan Relations  
Academics and popular writers have written several works on the history of 
the Sook Ching Massacre and that of the Japanese Occupation in Singapore.
35
 
Though these books contain vivid details of the massacre and provide in-depth 
analysis of the multi-faceted history of the Syonan
36
 years, they hardly discuss 
how ordinary Chinese Singaporeans remember this dark period in their 
nation’s history. Furthermore, in contrast to the well-researched field on the 
Nanjing Massacre, there is currently a dearth of historiographical studies on 
the Sook Ching Massacre. Notwithstanding their limitations, historical works 
on Sook Ching and the Japanese Occupation are still relevant to my research 
as they provide useful background information on the events.  
 
Scholarship on Singapore’s war memories have emerged over the past fifteen 
years. These works include studies on official and popular memories which 
are pertinent to my research. On the one hand, most scholars stress the 
                                                 
34 Utpal Vyas, Soft Power in Japan-China Relations: State, Sub-state and Non-state Relations 
(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011). 
35 For an introduction to the Sook Ching Massacre, see Ian Ward, The Killer They Called a 
God (Singapore: Media Masters, 1992), and Ralph Modder, The Singapore Chinese Massacre, 
18 February to 4 March 1942 (Singapore: Horizon Books, 2004). For a well-researched work 
on life during the Japanese Occupation, see Paul H. Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of 
Malaya: A Social and Economic History (London: C. Hurst, 1998). 
36 During the Japanese Occupation, Singapore was renamed Syonan which means “Light of 
the South” in the Japanese language. 
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prominence of official memories of the Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese 
Occupation in Singapore. Kevin Blackburn and Karl Hack argue that the 
People’s Action Party (PAP) government plays a leading role in the 
construction of state-sanctioned memories of the Syonan period and the 
Japanese atrocities. They point out that the ruling party has cast the Civilian 
War Memorial, which buries the remains of Sook Ching victims, as a national 
and multiracial, instead of a Chinese, war memorial. Its four pillars represent 
Singapore’s four main ethnic groups who all underwent common suffering 
during the Japanese Occupation. Therefore, the memorial embodies 
Singapore’s official memories of the Sook Ching Massacre as the PAP wants 
the atrocities to be remembered as a tragedy which affected all races in the 
country, not simply the Chinese alone. This means that Chinese Singaporeans’ 
popular memories of the massacre are subordinated to the state’s official 
memories.
37
 Diana Wong agrees with Blackburn and Hack. She adds that after 
neglecting war memories in the 1970s and 1980s, the PAP administration 
began spearheading the remembrance of the Sook Ching Massacre and the 
Japanese Occupation from the 1990s to promote a sense of national identity 
among its citizenry.
38
 Similarly, Hamzah Muzaini contends that war 
commemoration in Singapore remains a state-driven initiative as ordinary 
Singaporeans are interested neither in remembering the war nor visiting the 
Civilian War Memorial. Thus, whereas Sook Ching is part of Singapore’s 
                                                 
37 Blackburn, and Hack, War, Memory. 
38 Diana Wong, “Memory Suppression and Memory Production: The Japanese Occupation of 
Singapore”, in Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s), eds. Fujitani, T., Geoffrey M. 




official memories, it is not part of its popular memories.
39
 Asad-ul Iqbal Latif 
nonetheless rejects the assessment of the above scholars. He claims that 
memories of the Second World War are “missing” in Singapore because the 
Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese Occupation do not feature prominently 
in both the city-state’s official memories and popular memories.40   
 
On the other hand, works on popular war memories of the Sook Ching 
Massacre and the Japanese Occupation are comparatively fewer than those on 
official memories. An important study on popular memories is that by P. Lim 
Pui Huen who examines the memoirs and biographies of war survivors in 
Singapore, including those of Sook Ching. She observes that the memories of 
wartime suffering, which is the common theme of these written accounts, 
remain deeply etched in the survivors’ minds decades after the war ended.41 
The subject of Chinese suffering during the war is similarly reflected in Yeo 
Song Nian’s and Ng Siew Ai’s research on local Chinese literature in the post-
war period.
42
 Ernest Koh bridges the gap between Singapore’s official 
memories and popular memories of the war. He acknowledges that while the 
PAP government plays a leading role in the construction of the republic’s 
official war memories, popular memories of the conflict continue to persist in 
                                                 
39 Hamzah Muzaini, “Producing/Consuming Memoryscapes: The Genesis/Politics of Second 
World War Commemoration in Singapore”, GeoJournal, 66, 3, Heritage, Politics and Identity 
in Southeast Asia (July 2006), pp. 211-222.  
40 Asad-ul Iqbal Latif, “Singapore’s Missing War”, in Legacies of World War II in South and 
East Asia, ed. David Koh Wee Hock (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 
pp. 92-103. 
41 P. Lim Pui Huen, “Memories of War in Malaya”, in Malaya and Singapore during the 
Japanese Occupation, ed. Paul H. Kratoska (Singapore: Department of History, National 
University of Singapore, 1995), pp. 121-147. 
42 Yeo Song Nian and Ng Siew Ai, “The Japanese Occupation as Reflected in Singapore-
Malayan Chinese Literary Works after the Japanese Occupation (1945-49)”, in War and 
Memory in Malaysia and Singapore, eds. P. Lim Pui Huen and Diana Wong (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), pp. 106-119. 
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the private and familial realms. Yet these popular memories are marginalised 
by the state due to their incompatibility with the homogeneous national war 
narrative.
43
 My research will extend the work done thus far in official 
memories and popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese 
Occupation in Singapore. I shall explore the relationship between both types 
of memories in Singapore in order to comprehend how the state shapes 
Chinese Singaporeans’ memories of the war.   
 
Understanding Singapore’s bilateral ties with post-war Japan is necessary to 
appreciate its impact on the city-state’s war memories. Several major works in 
this field cover the various political, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions 
of Singapore-Japan relations. Junko Tomaru examines Malaya’s and 
Singapore’s diplomatic and economic rapprochement with Japan before the 
republic’s independence in 1965. She stresses that in the late 1950s, Singapore 
leaders were more eager to seek closer ties with Japan, through economic 
investments and technological know-how, than to remember the Sook Ching 
Massacre. In spite of Chinese Singaporeans’ demands for Japan to compensate 
the families of Sook Ching victims, the Labour Front government did not want 
the historical issue to jeopardise mutually beneficial rapprochement with 
Japan. Therefore, the state prevented Chinese popular memories of the Sook 
Ching Massacre from hindering its foreign relations with Japan.
44
 Shimizu 
Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi further explain that the interlocking economic 
ties between Japan and pre-independent Singapore warrant memories of the 
                                                 
43 Ernest Koh, “De-historicising the Second World War: Diaspora, Nation, and the Overseas 
Chinese”, in The Pacific War: Aftermaths, Remembrance and Culture, eds. Christina Twomey, 
and Ernest Koh (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 11-31. 
44 Junko Tomaru, The Postwar Rapprochement of Malaya and Japan, 1945-1961: The Roles 
of Britain and Japan in South-East Asia (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 2000). 
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Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese Occupation to be placed on the back-
burner.
45
 Robin Ramcharan also discusses the warm relations that independent 
Singapore has enjoyed with Japan. Many aspects of the PAP government’s 
policies, such as raising industrial productivity, were adapted from Japan as 
part of its “Learn from Japan” campaign in the 1980s to boost its economic 
growth.
46
 Sociologist Chua Beng Huat nevertheless disagrees with his claim. 
Chua offers an alternative interpretation of Singapore-Japan relations by 
studying Japanese cultural influence in Singapore in the 1980s and 1990s 
which is roughly the same period as Ramcharan’s study. Chua asserts that 
despite the ubiquity of Japanese popular culture in Singapore, the assimilation 
of Japanese culture into Singapore culture remains limited.
47
 Thus, these 
multi-faceted works allow me to explore how and why Singapore’s ties with 
Japan from 1945 to 2015 shape Chinese Singaporeans’ popular memories of 
the Sook Ching Massacre. 
 
Overview of Thesis Chapters 
This thesis will be further divided into four chapters. Chapter Two will 
examine Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in China and the 
Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore from 1945 to the early 1980s. Between the 
end of the war in 1945 and the outbreak of the Japanese history textbook 
controversy in 1982, China’s domestic politics and its foreign policy towards 
Japan were important factors in the marginalisation of popular memories of 
                                                 
45 Shimizu Hiroshi, and Hirakawa Hitoshi, Japan and Singapore in the World Economy: 
Japan’s Economic Advance into Singapore, 1870-1965 (London: Routledge, 1999). 
46 Robin Ramcharan, Forging a Singaporean Statehood, 1965-1995: The Contribution of 
Japan (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002). 
47 Chua Beng Huat, “‘Where got Japanese Influence in Singapore!’”, in Japan in Singapore: 
Cultural Occurrences and Cultural Flows, eds. Eyal Ben-Ari, and John Clammer (Surrey: 
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the Nanjing Massacre. Specifically, the onset of the Cold War and the Chinese 
Civil War, the CCP regime’s de-emphasis on Chinese victimhood under the 
Japanese, and the PRC’s pursuit of rapprochement with Japan relegated 
popular memories of the massacre to the private sphere. However, from 1945 
to the launch of the “Learn from Japan” campaign in 1980, Singapore’s 
domestic politics and its foreign policy towards Japan did not uniformly shape 
Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre. Notwithstanding the 
PAP government’s demands for war reparations from Japan, Singapore sought 
Japanese investments to build its economy. As a result, while popular 
memories of Sook Ching were visible, not all of them contained anti-Japanese 
sentiments. Chapter Three will analyse Chinese popular memories of the 
Nanjing Massacre in China between 1982 and 2015. The rise of Chinese 
nationalism to bolster the CCP’s political legitimacy, and China’s bilateral 
tensions with Japan over history issues has contributed to the growth of 
popular memories of the massacre alongside official memories. These popular 
memories homogeneously embody nationalistic anti-Japanese feelings and are 
synonymous with the state narrative. Chapter Four will explore Chinese 
popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore from 1980 to 
2015. The PAP government does not allow popular memories of the massacre 
to jeopardise Singapore’s close ties with Japan as exemplified by its “Learn 
from Japan” campaign. Although popular memories of Sook Ching persist, 
they are diversified and may not necessarily contain anti-Japanese sentiments 
or reflect official memories. Chapter Five will conclude my research by 
reiterating my research aims and discussing the differences between Chinese 
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popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in China and those of the Sook 
Ching Massacre in Singapore. 
 
In summary, I shall attempt to answer the following four questions in this 
study. Firstly, to what extent do the people of Chinese descent in China and 
Singapore remember the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre 
respectively from 1945 to 2015? Secondly, what are the differences between 
Chinese popular memories of the atrocities in both states, and why are they 
different? Thirdly, what is the nature of the relationship between Chinese 
popular memories of the respective massacre and the corresponding official 
memories in China and Singapore? Fourthly, how and why do China’s and 
Singapore’s domestic politics and bilateral ties with Japan between 1945 and 
2015 shape Chinese popular memories of the respective massacre? I shall 






CHINESE POPULAR MEMORIES OF THE NANJING MASSACRE IN 
CHINA AND THE SOOK CHING MASSACRE IN SINGAPORE,  
1945-EARLY 1980s 
 
Even though the Chinese civilian populations in China and Singapore 
experienced similar traumas and suffering during the Nanjing Massacre and 
the Sook Ching Massacre respectively, they remembered the atrocities 
differently after the war ended in 1945. These differences in Chinese popular 
memories of the respective massacre persisted until the early 1980s, 
specifically 1982 in China and 1980 in Singapore. 1982 and 1980 were the 
respective watershed year in the history of China’s and Singapore’s post-war 
relations with Japan. The outbreak of the Japanese history textbook 
controversy in 1982 worsened China-Japan ties, while Singapore embarked on 
the “Learn from Japan” campaign in 1980 which ushered in an unprecedented 
period of close Singapore-Japan cooperation. This chapter will explore the 
extent to which Chinese civilians in China and Singapore remember the 
respective massacre, the differences in these memories, and the reasons for 
these differences. The ways in which China’s and Singapore’s domestic 
politics, as well as their foreign policies towards Japan shaped these popular 







Popular Memories of the Nanjing Massacre in China, 1945-1982 
War of Resistance and Nanjing Massacre, 1937-1945    
The Second Sino-Japanese War, which is better known in China as the War of 
Resistance Against Japan (KangRi Zhanzhen, thereafter, the War of 
Resistance), had its roots in the creation of a modern imperial Japanese state in 
1868. After overthrowing the feudal Tokugawa shogunate that year, Japan’s 
new Meiji leaders modelled the country after the Western colonial powers, and 
they successfully transformed it into a modern and powerful nation through 
economic, military, and other wide-ranging reforms. Japan displayed its new-
found military prowess in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and easily 
defeated Qing China. As a result, it gained the Chinese territory of Taiwan. In 
1905, Japan became the first Asian country to defeat a Western power – 
Russia, before colonising Korea five years later. Japan henceforth became the 
only non-Western imperial power in the world. The Japanese military 
subsequently increased its political influence at the expense of the civilian 
government, and waged wars in the name of the Emperor. Japan’s imperialist 
ambitions grew in the 1930s, as demonstrated by its annexation of China’s 




Full-scale war broke out between Japan and China in August 1937 following 
military skirmishes at Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao) in northern China a 
month earlier.
2
 The Imperial Japanese Army swept southwards to China’s two 
most important cities, namely the financial hub of Shanghai and the national 
capital of Nanjing. After Shanghai fell to enemy hands in November 1937, the 
                                                 
1 Peter Duus, Modern Japan, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), pp. 61-220.  
2 Ibid., p. 222. 
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ruling Kuomintang (KMT, also known as the Guomindang or Nationalist 
Party) decided to shift the capital city to Chongqing in western China. Before 
he left for Chongqing, KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) instructed 
General Tang Shengzhi to resolutely defend Nanjing. Yet the Chinese forces 
under Tang could not resist the Japanese onslaught, and the general himself 
fled the city on 12 December 1937. Facing no resistance, the Japanese soldiers 
marched into the fallen capital the next day. For the subsequent six weeks, 
they wantonly massacred and raped Chinese civilians who were living there. 
These atrocities, together with looting and arson, became collectively known 
in China as the Nanjing Massacre.
3
 In the English-speaking world, it is also 




    
After the war, the Allied-run International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE), commonly called the Tokyo Trial, tried and sentenced to death two 
Japanese military leaders and one civilian politician for their involvement in 
the Nanjing Massacre. In liberated Nanjing, the triumphant KMT government 
arrived at the same verdict in 1947 for another three Japanese military leaders 
who were accused of the same crime. Though the IMTFE ruled that at least 
200,000 died in the massacre, the CCP, which seized power in 1949, claimed 
that 300,000 had died instead. Since the 1980s, this figure has become the 
official total death toll in China for the Nanjing Massacre.
5
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Forgetting the Nanjing Massacre, 1945-1982 
The onset of the Chinese Civil War and the global Cold War soon after 
Japan’s unconditional surrender in August 1945 contributed to memories of 
the Nanjing Massacre taking a back seat in the minds of China’s political 
leaders and masses. The victorious KMT regime chose not to bring up 
memories of the massacre as Chiang wanted to cultivate post-war Japan as an 
anti-communist Cold War ally.
6
 He thus announced a “magnanimous policy 
(kuanda zhengce)” towards Japan to earn the goodwill of the Japanese people. 
Based on the principle of “returning good for evil (yide baoyuan)”, he toned 
down China’s demands for Japanese war reparations.7 With Japan’s defeat, 
both the KMT and the CCP no longer had a common enemy. Instead, the 
outbreak of the Chinese Civil War resulted in them perceiving each other as its 
main adversary. For instance, the Communists repeatedly accused the 
Nationalists of perpetuating war crimes, but they de-emphasised memories of 
Japanese war crimes.
8
 During the Cold War, the CCP perceived the United 
States, which was the KMT’s main foreign supporter, as China’s new 
imperialist foe.
9
 It also claimed that the KMT was an American puppet that 
exploited the Chinese people.
10
 Popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre 
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also did not surface in the form of first-hand accounts, such as autobiographies, 
memoirs, and oral history interviews, during this period of domestic turmoil 
and international uncertainty. Chinese civilians were more concerned with 
bread-and-butter issues than with remembering their wartime suffering.  
 
Memories of the Nanjing Massacre remained buried when the CCP came to 
power and established the PRC in October 1949. Chairman Mao Zedong 
promoted a new historical narrative of Communist-led victory over both Japan 
and the KMT to buttress his party’s political legitimacy. He viewed the 
Nanjing Massacre, which represented the “century of humiliation” and 
Chinese wartime victimisation, as incompatible with the official victor 
narrative.
11
 Furthermore, as Nanjing was the KMT stronghold, the CCP played 
no role in defending it. This meant that the heroic narrative of Communist 
resistance against the Japanese invaders was inapplicable to Nanjing.
12
 Thus, 
Mao’s government saw no reason to remember the Nanjing Massacre, leading 
it to ban the publication of a 1962 manuscript on the event by Nanjing 
University researchers. The Nanjing city government kept the manuscript 
which was made available only to Japanese visitors interested in the city’s war 
history.
13
 Even Marxist intellectual Guo Moruo, who had been vigorously 
raising international awareness of the Nanjing Massacre during the War of 
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Resistance, changed his stance after 1949.
14
 He now claimed that the massacre 
was merely one of the many atrocities that imperial Japan committed during 
the Second World War in Asia-Pacific.
15
 As a result, between 1945 and 1982, 
the Nanjing Massacre was largely not remembered by Chinese political 
leaders, scholars, and citizens as one of the most traumatic and brutal cases of 
Japanese wartime aggression.
16
 It was therefore not surprising that the Nanjing 
Massacre was hardly mentioned in the CCP’s mouthpiece, the Renmin Ribao 
(People’s Daily).17  
 
Nonetheless, it was not true that Maoist China completely marginalised all 
memories of the Nanjing Massacre before 1982. The CCP occasionally 
brought up the massacre to attack its Cold War rivals, namely the KMT and 
the United States. The Communists allowed former Nationalist generals, who 
were living in the PRC, to publish their memoirs in the 1960s. These writings 
mentioned the Nanjing Massacre, but they did not emphasise Chinese 
suffering. Instead, they highlighted the KMT’s failure to defend the city from 
the Japanese invaders.
18
 China’s state-controlled press further claimed that 
American missionaries in Nanjing were also responsible for the massacre as 
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they were accomplices of the Japanese.
19
 Hence, the CCP regime manipulated 
memories of the Nanjing Massacre, not because it wanted to stress Chinese 
victimhood and suffering, but because it wanted to use these official memories 
to denounce Nationalist incompetence and American imperialism. In this way, 
memories of the massacre became a tool for the CCP to bolster its political 
legitimacy. 
 
However, it should be noted that official memories of the Nanjing Massacre 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph were an exception rather than the rule in 
China between 1945 and 1982. The Communist party-state generally opposed 
any public attempts to remember the atrocities. Yet, a few Chinese 
intellectuals tried to resist the official policy without avail. In September 1955, 
an academic from the predecessor of the present-day China University of 
Political Science and Law, Xu Dunzhang, urged the Chinese masses to be 
wary of Japanese conservatives who whitewashed Japan’s war history and 
undermined Sino-Japanese friendship. More importantly, he called on the 
Chinese people to remember the Nanjing Massacre and the Japanese invasion 
of their country.
20
 It was likely that the CCP did not accept Xu’s suggestions. 
Similarly, the Chinese judge at the IMTFE, Mei Ru’ao, wrote an article which 
detailed Japanese atrocities in Nanjing and proposed greater historical research 
on the massacre.
21
 He was consequently denounced as a traitor during the 
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Cultural Revolution for undermining the amity and goodwill between the 
Chinese and Japanese people.
22
 Therefore, Chinese memories of the Nanjing 
Massacre were largely marginalised in the official realm by domestic and 
foreign considerations. 
 
The PRC’s attempts to forge closer ties with Japan, in spite of the absence of 
formal diplomatic relations, from 1949 to 1972 contributed to the stifling of 
both official and popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre. Plagued by 
regional Cold War tensions in the first two decades of its rule, the CCP 
government sought to counter American hostility. It did so by courting Japan 
as a political ally, and by portraying the United States as China’s and Japan’s 
common Cold War enemy.
23
 More importantly, the Communists blamed a 
“small handful of Japanese militarists” for invading China in 1937, but 
portrayed the Japanese people as peace-loving masses who were innocent 
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victims of the militarists.
24
 Although Washington prevented Tokyo from 
normalising relations with Beijing, it did not object to them engaging in 
informal trade which grew gradually between 1949 and 1972.
25
 Both states 
also forged closer people-to-people interactions through the Japan-China 
Friendship Association that was formed in Japan in 1950.
26
 Furthermore, 
Japanese politico-economic and socio-cultural groups travelled regularly to 
Beijing for private discussions with Chinese leaders. For example, from 1950 
to 1975, Premier Zhou Enlai met 610 Japanese delegations for a total of 287 
times.
27
 He even brushed off memories of the war and the Nanjing Massacre 
by telling visiting Japanese parliamentarians in 1954 that the conflict was “a 
thing of the past” and Sino-Japanese friendship was paramount in the post-war 
period.
28
 In addition, the CCP treated Japanese war criminals magnanimously. 
Between June and July 1956, it released over a thousand of them without 
prosecuting them. The remaining forty-five were jailed, but they were 
repatriated to Japan eight years later.
29
 While in prison, these Japanese war 
criminals were well-treated, and they received political and moral “re-
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education” to ensure that they were remorseful for their wrongdoings.30 When 
these former war criminals returned to Japan, they became staunch advocates 
of Sino-Japanese friendship and reconciliation.
31
 The PRC’s leniency towards 
Japanese war criminals clearly showed that its foreign policy towards Japan 
was largely driven by its pursuit of Sino-Japanese friendship and goodwill.
32
 
Traumatic memories of Chinese suffering and victimhood during the Nanjing 
Massacre had no place in China’s cordial interactions with Japan.  
 
The marginalisation of official memories of the Nanjing Massacre during 
Mao’s rule brought about a corresponding marginalisation of popular 
memories in China. When French intellectual Simone de Beauvoir visited 
Nanjing in 1950, her Chinese hostess told her that she had learnt to forget the 
massacre, but her facial expression showed otherwise.
33
 It was clear that she, 
like most ordinary Chinese living in the 1950s and 1960s, still retained 
memories of the atrocities despite being compelled by the state to forget them. 
From a sociological perspective, the hostess’ involuntary form of forgetting is 
known as “repressive erasure”. Paul Connerton argues that this phenomenon is 
common among authoritarian and revolutionary governments which seek to 
eradicate memories of past events associated with previous regimes.
34
 Given 
that the CCP government considered its revolutionary triumph in 1949 as the 
birth of a new historical era, it had a valid reason to stifle popular memories of 
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a massacre that happened in the pre-revolutionary era and in the former 
regime’s capital. Therefore, first-hand accounts of the Nanjing Massacre by 
Chinese civilians were publicly marginalised in Maoist China, but most of 
these memories persisted quietly in the minds of private Chinese citizens, such 
as de Beauvoir’s hostess.35  
 
The Communist party-state’s attitudes towards memories of the Nanjing 
Massacre remained unchanged during the “honeymoon” period from 1972 to 
1982 when China and Japan enjoyed warm relations.
36
 When Japanese Prime 
Minister Tanaka Kakuei visited Beijing in September 1972 to normalise 
relations, Mao unexpectedly thanked him because Japan’s wartime aggression 
allowed the CCP to build up its strength and eventually defeat the inept 
KMT.
37
 Despite their unhappiness when Tanaka alluded to Japan’s past 
invasion as “causing great inconvenience (tianle henda mafan)” to China, 
Chinese leaders placed priority on improving bilateral ties.
38
 The PRC also 
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decided not to seek war reparations from Japan,
39
 and both states officially 
restored ties in August 1978 with the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace and 
Friendship Treaty.
40
 Yinan He stressed that “[h]istory was simply swept under 
the carpet” as growing economic and political ties with Tokyo were of 
paramount importance to Beijing.
41
 For example, Sino-Japanese bilateral trade 
rose more than nine times in absolute terms between 1972 and 1981.
42
 
Meanwhile, the CCP government continued to forbid school textbooks and the 
state-run media to mention the Nanjing Massacre.
43
 Moreover, China did not 
protest when Class “A” war criminals, including those responsible for the 
Nanjing Massacre, were enshrined at the Yasukuni Shrine in 1978, and when 
five Japanese prime ministers visited it between 1972 and 1981.
44
 Improving 
relations with Japan dictated that popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre 
remain marginalised in China, but they would soon resurface in 1982 when 
bilateral ties became less rosy. 
 
Popular Memories of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore, 1945-1980 
Japanese Occupation and Sook Ching Massacre, 1942-1945 
Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia in 1941, and its subsequent occupation of 
Singapore, was a continuation of the Second Sino-Japanese War. By 1941, the 
United States and other Western colonial powers had imposed an economic 
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embargo on Japan in a bid to halt its aggression of China. Japan therefore 
needed raw materials, such as oil, tin, and rubber, from resource-rich 
Southeast Asia to support its war effort in China. After diplomatic negotiations 
with the United States failed, the Japanese military leadership decided to 
attack the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, which would paralyse the 
country’s ability to prevent the Japanese military advance into Southeast Asia. 
The Pacific War broke out on the night of 7-8 December 1941 when the 
Japanese military simultaneously bombed Pearl Harbor and landed its first 
troops on the north-eastern coast of British Malaya. Singapore also came 
under Japanese aerial bombing for the first time. The well-trained and 
disciplined Japanese soldiers of the Twenty-fifth Army easily outmanoeuvred 
the complacent and incompetent British troops who were forced into constant 
retreat. Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki’s seventy-day Malayan 
Campaign successfully cumulated in the capitulation of the British island-
fortress of Singapore on 15 February 1942. The Fall of Singapore, which 
wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill bemoaned as “the worst disaster” 
for the British Empire,
45
 ushered in three-and-a-half years of the Japanese 
Occupation.
46
     
 
The Sook Ching Massacre began in Singapore soon after the British 
surrendered. The Imperial Japanese Army renamed the island “Syonan” which 
became part of Japan’s wartime empire – the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. Nevertheless, Japanese rule brought fear, not prosperity, to the local 
Chinese population. Yamashita and his Chief of Planning and Operations, 
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Lieutenant Colonel Tsuji Masanobu, were determined to suppress potential 
anti-Japanese resistance among the Chinese before the Twenty-fifth Army left 
Singapore to invade Dutch-controlled Sumatra. Hence, on 18 February 1942, 
Yamashita launched the Sook Ching campaign which Tsuji planned and 
carried out. The operation primarily aimed to eliminate anti-Japanese Chinese 
individuals, like armed members of the pro-British Straits Settlements 
Volunteer Force (SSVF) and the Chinese-dominated Dalforce, as well as those 
who belonged to the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the China Relief 
Fund which financed China’s war effort. Looters, armed civilians, and anyone 




Sook Ching started when the Japanese military ordered all Chinese males 
between eighteen and fifty years old to report to twenty-eight screening 
centres island-wide. These centres included Chinatown, Jalan Besar, and 
Telok Kurau.
48
 At these centres, the Kempeitai (Japanese military police) 
identified and sieved out anti-Japanese individuals. Such mass screening 
became infamously known to the local Chinese as “jianzheng (identification 
parade)”.49 The Kempeitai lacked a uniform procedure of organising and 
interrogating the detainees who were kept at the screening centres without 
food and water between a day and a week. With the assistance of local 
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collaborators, the military police randomly selected their victims who might 
not necessarily be anti-Japanese. For instance, Chinese men who wore glasses, 
were from Hainan, or were English-educated were singled out as the Japanese 





Different fates awaited those who “passed” the screening and those who 
“failed” it. On the one hand, those who “passed” were deemed to be compliant 
subjects of the Japanese Empire. They were henceforth released with the 
Chinese character “jian (examined)” stamped on a piece of paper and given to 
them, or on their bodies and clothes. On the other hand, those who “failed” the 
screening were considered to be subversive anti-Japanese elements. Military 
trucks drove them to their execution sites where Japanese soldiers killed and 
buried them on the spot.
51
 Their remains were only discovered in 1962, and 
were excavated from thirty-five sites in Singapore, such as Changi in the east 
and Jurong in the west, between 1963 and 1966.
52
 The Sook Ching Massacre 
lasted till 04 March 1942, but the Kempeitai persisted in hunting down alleged 
anti-Japanese individuals.
53
 Although Japan claimed after the war that a 
maximum of only 5,000 Chinese were killed in the massacre,
54
 the Chinese 
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community in Singapore estimated the total death toll to be between 20,000 




When the Pacific War ended in August 1945, the families of Sook Ching 
victims were determined to seek justice and compensation from Japan. The 
victorious British colonial authorities set up many military tribunals to try 
Japanese war criminals in Singapore and Malaya. Among them was the 
Chinese Massacre Trial which tried Japanese war criminals who were accused 
of perpetrating the Sook Ching Massacre. It commenced in March 1947 at the 
Victoria Memorial Hall with much public attention and media publicity, 
especially from the local Chinese community. The seven defendants were all 
military officers.
56
 However, the masterminds of the massacre were not among 
those standing trial. Yamashita was executed by the Americans in December 
1945 after being found guilty of committing war crimes in the Philippines.
57
 In 
contrast, the United States shielded Tsuji from war crimes prosecution as his 
anti-communist credentials suited its Cold War aim of transforming Japan into 
an anti-Red bulwark in Asia.
58
 When the trial ended in April 1947, the British 
military court found all seven men guilty, but only two were sentenced to 
death. The remaining five defendants were handed life sentences.
59
 The 
Chinese in Singapore, who had wanted the death penalty to be imposed on all 
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seven defendants, denounced the sentences as too lenient. Their resentment 




Rapprochement with Japan, 1945-1980 
Singapore’s post-war rapprochement with Japan began when the American 
Occupation authorities allowed Japan to partially recommence private trade 
with foreign territories in 1947. Such trade became full-fledged by January 
1950.
61
 Singapore-Japan bilateral trade grew between 1949 and 1955 when 
Japan exported a range of primary products, such as cotton, vegetables, and 
cement, to the British colony.
62
 To counter the spread of communism among 
the poor and unemployed in Singapore, British colonial officials and the local 
Labour Front government sought Japan’s economic and technical assistance to 
develop Singapore’s industries and thereby create jobs for the people.63 
Contrary to the mass anti-Japanese demonstrations which Japanese Prime 
Minister Kishi Nobusuke faced in Indonesia in November 1957, he did not 
encounter similar protests when he visited Singapore earlier that month. In 
spite of latent anti-Japanese feelings arising from popular memories of the 
Sook Ching Massacre, local Chinese businesses and newspapers, as well as the 
Labour Front administration, warmly welcomed Kishi’s visit which aimed to 
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boost Japanese trade and investments in Singapore.
64
 Chief Minister Lim Yew 
Hock (Lin Youfu) even told the prime minister that Japanese companies were 
welcome to open factories in Singapore “with 100 per cent Japanese capital, 
and profits can [sic] be remitted to Japan freely”.65 Kishi’s visit was a success 
as eighteen Japanese firms subsequently set up businesses in Singapore 




When the PAP government was elected in June 1959, it continued to pursue 
rapprochement with Japan through economic cooperation. Bilateral ties were 
enhanced with the signing of the Singapore-Japan Tax Convention in April 
1961 to end double taxation and encourage Japanese investments in the city-
state.
67
 Between December 1960 and January 1961, Singapore also sought 
Japanese expertise and investments to develop its nascent industries in 
Jurong.
68
 For instance, the Jurong Shipyard was formed in April 1963 through 
a joint venture between Singapore’s Economic Development Board and 
Japan’s Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Limited.69 By 1967, Japan had 
become the largest foreign investor in Jurong, with a paid-up capital of 
approximately S$26.5 million.
70
 It was also the biggest investor in the metal, 
                                                 
64 Tomaru, Postwar Rapprochement, pp. 181, and 188-194. 
65 DRO, Tokyo, A’ 1.5.1.5, 27 November 1957, and A’ 1.5.1.5-2, undated November 1957, 
both cited in Shimizu, and Hirakawa, Japan and Singapore, p. 163. 
66 Various company history books, cited in Shimizu, and Hirakawa, Japan and Singapore, p. 
167, Table 6.3. 
67 Tomaru, Postwar Rapprochement, p. 211. 
68 Tonan Ajia Chosakai, Tonan Ajia Yoran (A Survey of Southeast Asia) (Tokyo: Tonan Ajia 
Chosakai, 1961), p. 178, and Matsuo Hiroshi, “Keizai Kaihatsu no Tokucho (Main Features of 
Economic Development)”, in Maraya Shingaporu no Keizai Kaihatsu (The Economic 
Development of Malaya and Singapore), ed. Matsuo Hiroshi (Tokyo: Institute of Developing 
Economies, 1962), pp. 151-152, both cited in Shimizu, and Hirakawa, Japan and Singapore, 
pp. 183-184. 
69 Shimizu, and Hirakawa, Japan and Singapore, pp. 197-198. 
70 Tao-chang Chiang, The Jurong Industrial Estate: Present Pattern and Future Prospects 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia, Nanyang University, 1969), p. 55, Table 17. 
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engineering, wood, paper, and chemical industries there.
71
 Japanese 
investments in Singapore were mutually beneficial. Singapore’s economy 





However, an obstacle to Singapore-Japan post-war rapprochement was the 
“blood debt (xuezhai)” issue. It referred to the moral and financial obligation 
that the Chinese in Singapore felt Japan “owed” them for killing innocent 
civilians during the Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese Occupation. They 
were determined to seek compensation from Japan for the lives lost.
73
 Anti-
Japanese sentiments among the local Chinese rose and their war memories 
were revived when the mass graves of Sook Ching victims were found and 
unearthed between 1962 and 1966.
74
 Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (Li 
Guangyao) insisted that the British colonial government, which had signed the 
Treaty of San Francisco in September 1951 to resolve the issue of Japanese 
war reparations, did not represent the people of Singapore.
75
 Therefore, he 
expected “a suitable gesture of genuine regret” from Japan for its wartime 
atrocities in the island.
76
 The “blood debt” issue was finally resolved after 
Singapore gained independence in August 1965. Following the establishment 
of formal diplomatic relations between both states in April 1966, the republic 
                                                 
71 Ibid., p. 20, Table 8; p. 22, Table 9; and p. 29, Table 14. 
72 Shimizu, and Hirakawa, Japan and Singapore, p. 205. 
73 Blackburn, and Hack, War, Memory, p. 148. 
74 Chew, “Rest in Peace”, p. 268, and 270-271. 
75 Lee Kuan Yew, “Remembering the Victims of the Japanese Occupation: Speech at a 
Meeting of the Memorial Fund Committee at the Victoria Theatre (21 April 1963)”, in The 
Papers of Lee Kuan Yew: Speeches, Interviews, and Dialogues, Vol. 2: 1963-1965, eds. Julia 
Chee, Fan Wenjun, Ng Yoke Lin, Tan Bee Leng, June Lin, and Joanne Yip (Singapore: Gale 
Asia, 2012), pp. 8-9. 
76 Ibid., p. 9. 
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accepted S$50 million from Japan as “quasi-reparations”77, consisting of S$25 
million in grant and another S$25 million in loan, in October that year.
78
 The 
PAP government used both the grant and the loan to support mainly Jurong’s 
industrialisation programme.
79
 Lee accepted the sum as the final settlement for 
the “blood debt” issue because building cordial ties with Japan and attracting 
Japanese investments were his administration’s priorities.80 Besides urging the 
local Chinese community to accept the closure of the “blood debt” issue, he 
did not demand an official apology from Japan for its atrocities committed in 
Singapore during the war.
81
 The obstacle to the post-war reconciliation 
between Singapore and Japan was finally removed. 
 
Singapore forged closer economic ties with Japan after the resolution of the 
“blood debt” issue. Notwithstanding the latent Chinese popular memories of 
the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore, economic cooperation took precedence 
in the city-state’s relations with Japan. When Lee visited Tokyo in 1967,82 he 
told Prime Minister Sato Eisaku that Singapore welcomed Japanese capital, 
investments, and technological expertise as it had “no inhibitions as a result of 
our [sic] experiences in the Second World War. The chapter is [sic] closed, 
                                                 
77 Shimizu, and Hirakawa, Japan and Singapore, p. 214. 
78 Embassy of the Republic of Singapore, Tokyo, “The Embassy”, 
http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/tokyo/about_the_embassy/the_embassy.
html (accessed on 25 June 2015), and “$25m Grant, $25m Loans Settle Singapore’s Blood 
Debt”, The Straits Times (thereafter, ST), 26 October 1966, p. 20. 
79 Pitt, and Leong eds., The Liberation, p. 246. 
80 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000: Memoirs of 
Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Editions, 2000), p. 559. 
81 “Blood-debt Letter from Lee”, ST, 1 November 1966, p. 20, and Blackburn, and Hack, War, 
Memory, p. 164. 
82 Lee Kuan Yew, “Welcoming the Japanese to Singapore: As Investors and Industrialists: 
Speech at the State Banquet for the Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato (25 September 
1967)”, in The Papers of Lee Kuan Yew: Speeches, Interviews, and Dialogues, Vol. 4: 1967-
1968, eds. Julia Chee, Fan Wenjun, Ng Yoke Lin, Tan Bee Leng, June Lin, and Joanne Yip 
(Singapore: Gale Asia, 2012), pp. 186-189. 
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although not forgotten”. 83 Between 1966 and 1976, thirty-six Japanese 
economic experts visited Singapore to train and advise its officials, while 116 
Singapore bureaucrats underwent further training in Japan.
84
 Furthermore, 
Singapore’s imports of Japanese goods rose six times between 1965 and 
1972.
85
 Japanese investments in the republic meanwhile rose sixteen times 
between 1967 and 1977. By 1977, fifteen percent of total foreign investments 
in Singapore belonged to the Japanese.
86
 In the same year, a major Japanese 
firm, Sumitomo Chemical Corporation, invested more than US$1 billion in the 




Remembering the Sook Ching Massacre, 1945-1980 
Official memories of the Sook Ching Massacre were almost non-existent in 
Singapore from 1945 to 1980. Before independence, both the Labour Front 
and the PAP governments were more concerned with the MCP threat and 
socio-economic issues as they fought for self-rule from Britain. They also did 
not want memories of Sook Ching to jeopardise Singapore’s economic 
rapprochement with Japan. Thus, local politicians neither commemorated the 
massacre nor promoted an official narrative of the event. When Singapore 
unexpectedly separated from Malaysia in August 1965, the ruling PAP had to 
prove to Singaporeans that the city-state could survive and prosper as an 
independent entity against the odds. The nation’s future, not its past, was the 
government’s primary concern. It hence suppressed memories of Singapore’s 
                                                 
83 Ibid., p. 187. 
84 Ramcharan, Singaporean Statehood, p. 189. 
85 Kunio Yoshihara, “Japan’s Economic Relations with Southeast Asia”, Southeast Asian 
Affairs (1974), p. 59. 
86 Ramcharan, Singaporean Statehood, p. 169. 
87 Lee, From Third World to First, pp. 565-566. 
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pre-1965 past and abolished history as a primary school subject in 1972. 
Singapore’s national identity became firmly rooted in the present. The de-
emphasis of history suited the state’s overarching goal of building a robust and 
sustainable economy through industrialisation and the teaching of mathematics, 
science, and technical subjects in schools.
88
 More importantly, the PAP was 
reluctant to revive memories of the Sook Ching Massacre as Singapore needed 
Japanese investments and expertise to help develop its industrial economy.   
 
Although official memories of the Sook Ching Massacre were absent, Chinese 
popular memories of the atrocities persisted in Singapore. Table 1 below 
shows that a handful of first-hand accounts, such as autobiographies and 
memoirs, of Sook Ching victims were published in the immediate post-war 
period, from 1945 to 1960. All of them contained vivid descriptions of 
Japanese brutality, with strong anti-Japanese feelings. They showed that 
popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre were still raw among the 
island’s Chinese populace. The desire to seek compensation and justice for the 
victims, and the need to educate future generations on the horrors of the 
Japanese Occupation were among the rationale for the writing and publication 
of these works. Several more works were written and published between 1961 
and 1980, as seen in Table 1. However, unlike those published before 1961, 
these autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, and published oral history 
interviews did not homogeneously contain anti-Japanese emotions as the 
authors remembered Sook Ching differently. 
 
                                                 
88 Wong, “Memory Suppression”, p. 230, and Blackburn, and Hack, War, Memory, p. 294. 
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Table 1: Number of Published Autobiographies, Biographies, Memoirs, and 




Language of Publication 1945-1960 1961-1980 
English Language 2 6 
Chinese Language 6 3 
Total 8 9 
 
An example of a work that was published between 1945 and 1960 was a 
Chinese language commemorative journal which contained first-hand 
accounts of the Sook Ching Massacre and reflected anti-Japanese sentiments.
90
 
Published in 1947, this journal consisted of numerous articles by massacre 
survivors and their families who recounted their harrowing war experiences. 
Among them was Zheng Guangyu. After he “failed” the screening at a centre 
near New World Amusement Park in Jalan Besar, the Japanese military 
brought him and other victims to Changi beach to be machine-gunned. A 
bullet hit his nose, but he survived. After the shooting, the Japanese soldiers 
stabbed those who were still alive. Fortunately, they did not stab Zheng 
because they thought he was already dead. He surreptitiously left the beach 
after the Japanese departed, and he managed to return home safely the next 
day.
91
 In another memoir, a Mr. Chen narrated a similar experience that he 
underwent. He was supposed to be executed at Katong beach, but he fell into 
the sea with other victims before he was shot. He managed to untangle himself 
                                                 
89 Refer to the Appendix 2 for the authors, titles, and publication details of these works.  
90 Xingzhou bei Jianzhe Jiashu Funu Huzhuhui星洲被检者家属妇女互助会 (Singapore 
Women Mutual Aid Association of Victims’ Families) ed.,  Xingzhou Beijian Xishengzhe 
Wuzhounian Jinian Tekan星洲被检牺牲者五周年纪念特刊 [Special Commemorative Issue 
for the Fifth Anniversary of the Victims of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore] (Singapore: 
Xingzhou bei Jianzhe Jiashu Funu Huzhuhui (Singapore Women Mutual Aid Association of 
Victims’ Families), 1947). 
91 Zheng Guangyu 郑光宇, “Hukou Yusheng Tan 虎口余生谈 [Escaping from the Tiger’s 
Mouth]”, in ibid., pp. 15-19. 
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and swarm out to the sea before a fisherman rescued him.
92
 Other Chinese 
language memoirs likewise contained detailed accounts of Japanese atrocities 




Furthermore, popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre from 1945 to 
1960 included the experiences of war survivors who “passed” the screening. 
N.I. Low and H.M. Cheng wrote and published one of Singapore’s earliest 
English language books on the Japanese Occupation – This Singapore: Our 
City of Dreadful Night.
94
 As its title suggested, the memoir described the 
hardships faced by civilians throughout the Syonan years. It had a chapter 
which recounted Low’s and Cheng’s ordeal at the screening centre, and their 
compatriots’ unlucky fates when they “failed” the screening.95 Similarly, 
another war survivor, Si Yan was unwell before Sook Ching began, yet he had 
to report to the screening centre at Chinatown. After being detained there for 
four days under harsh conditions, his illness worsened. When it was his turn to 





                                                 
92 Hong Jintang洪锦棠, Jiehou Huiyi Lu劫后回忆录 [Post-war Memoirs] (Singapore: 
Liulian Chubanshe, 1946), p. 15. 
93 For example, see Dazhan yu Nanqiao Bianzuan Weiyuanhui 大战与南桥编纂委员会 ed., 
Dazhan yu Nanqiao: Malaiya Zhibu大战与南侨：马来亚之部 [The Second World War and 
the Nanyang Chinese: Malayan Section] (Singapore: Nanyang Huaqiao Chouzhen Zuguo 
Nanmin Zonghui and Xin Nanyang Chubanshe, 1947). 
94 N.I. Low, and H.M. Cheng, This Singapore: Our City of Dreadful Night (Singapore: City 
Book Store, [1947?]). 
95 Ibid., pp. 15-22. 
96 Si Yan 思严, “Jianzheng Datusha Lijie Ji 检证大屠杀历劫记 [A Record of Turbulent 
Experiences during the Sook Ching Massacre]”, in Zhaonan Lijie Ji: Cantong de Zhanzheng 
昭南历劫记：惨痛的战争 [A Record of Turbulent Experiences in Syonan: A Traumatic 
War], ed. Luo Hansong罗汉松 (Singapore: Xin Wenhua Jigou, [1950?]), pp. 16-22. 
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In contrast to the homogeneously anti-Japanese sentiments found in Chinese 
popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre between 1945 and 1960, first-
hand accounts of the massacre that were published from 1961 to 1980 
contained diverse popular memories which did not necessarily reflect such 
emotions. On the one hand, war survivors who still stressed Japanese brutality 
might have been influenced by the “blood debt” issue which gained traction 
among the local Chinese community after the remains of Sook Ching victims 
were found in 1962.
 97
 On the other hand, war survivors who did not 
emphasise Japanese atrocities highlighted other aspects of the Sook Ching 
Massacre which reflected fewer anti-Japanese emotions. For instance, they 
recalled how they “passed” the screening or avoided the screening centres 
altogether. Their willingness to remember these less brutal features of Sook 
Ching could have been a result of them being influenced by Singapore’s post-
war diplomatic and economic reconciliation with Japan.    
 
Among the war survivors who did not have vivid memories of the Sook Ching 
bloodbath were those who “passed” the screening. However, they clearly 
remembered their nerve-wrecking experiences at the various screening centres 
island-wide. For example, in an oral history interview in 1970, a merchant 
who lived in a rural village during the Japanese Occupation recounted how the 
Kempeitai interrogated him at a screening centre there. He said that whether 
one “passed” or “failed” the screening was dependent on how he answered 
their questions. When a Japanese officer asked him whether Chiang Kai-shek, 
                                                 
97 See, for example, Chen Su Lan, Remember Pompong and Oxley Rise (Singapore: Chen Su 
Lan Trust, 1969). 
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Tan Kah Kee (Chen Jiageng),
98
 and Wang Jingwei
99
 were “good” or “bad”, 
the merchant avoided answering the politically sensitive question directly. 
Fearing for his life, he wittily replied, “I am a businessman, am only 
concerned with doing business, [and] do not care who is good or bad!” Hence, 
he “passed” the screening and saved his own life.100         
 
Moreover, a handful of Chinese civilians in Singapore made the bold decision 
not to report to the Sook Ching screening centres and safely hid elsewhere. 
Teenager Ruth Ho and her kin left their Bukit Timah residence and headed to 
Arab Street for the screening. However, due to the large numbers of people 
walking to the centre, they were unable to reach their destination on that day. 
Thus, they decided not to report there and sought refuge at a family friend’s 
house instead. Ruth’s family was lucky that her fears of being discovered by 
the Japanese for not reporting to the screening centre did not materialise.
101
    
 
Conclusion 
I have shown in this chapter that Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing 
Massacre in China and the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore underwent 
different trajectories from 1945 to the early 1980s. On the other hand, popular 
memories of the Nanjing Massacre were marginalised by the state after the 
                                                 
98 Tan was the leader of the China Relief Fund, who fled to Java days before the Fall of 
Singapore. 
99 Wang was a KMT leader who defected to Japan and established a collaborationist 
government in Nanjing in 1940. 
100 Sannian Ling Ba ge Yue: Rijun Tongzhixia de Huaren Xiangcun Diaocha Xiaozu三年零
八个月：日军统治下的华人乡村调查小组 ed., Sannian Ling Ba ge Yue: Rijun Tongzhixia 
de Huaren Xiangcun (Chugao) 三年零八个月：日军统治下的华人乡村（初稿） [Three 
Years and Eight Months: Chinese Villages under Japanese Occupation (Draft Manuscript)] 
(Singapore: Nanyang Daxue Lishixi, 1970), p. 24.  




war due to domestic and foreign factors, such as the Chinese Civil War, Mao’s 
victor narrative, the international Cold War, and the CCP regime’s priority in 
cultivating China’s friendship with Japan. “Repressive erasure” resulted in 
popular memories of the massacre becoming largely publicly invisible among 
the Chinese populace. Civilian survivors of the Nanjing Massacre neither 
wrote nor published any first-hand accounts of the event between 1945 and 
1982. Their memories were hence strictly confined to the private realm. On 
the other hand, popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre persisted and 
were visible in Singapore from 1945 to 1980, despite Singapore’s courting of 
Japanese investments which were urgently needed to boost the city-state’s 
fledging economy. The “blood debt” issue and the PAP government’s 
demands for war reparations from Japan encouraged the development of these 
popular memories. Between 1945 and 1960, massacre survivors clearly 
expressed their traumatic feelings of having witnessed or survived the 
Japanese atrocities in their writings. These first-hand accounts uniformly 
contained anti-Japanese emotions, and reflected their authors’ common wishes 
to publicise the atrocities so as to seek justice and compensation for 
themselves, other Sook Ching victims and their families, as well as to educate 
the younger generations of Singapore’s traumatic wartime history. However, 
from 1961 to 1980, Chinese popular memories of Sook Ching became more 
varied, most likely as a result of Singapore’s economic rapprochement with 
Japan. Not all of these memories contained anti-Japanese sentiments as some 
of them emphasised the less brutal aspects of Sook Ching. Thus, diverse 
Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore co-




CHINESE POPULAR MEMORIES OF 
THE NANJING MASSACRE IN CHINA, 1982-2015 
 
The year 1982 was a turning point in China’s relations with Japan. The 
outbreak of the Japanese history textbook controversy that year revived 
Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre, ended the “honeymoon” 
period in bilateral ties, and led to subsequent fluctuations in Sino-Japanese 
relations that persist even today (2015). This surge in Chinese popular 
memories, as exemplified by the numerous published first-hand accounts of 
the Nanjing Massacre in the commercial market, has occurred simultaneously 
with the rise in official memories of the atrocities. In this chapter, I shall 
examine why and how the ruling CCP has used both official memories and 
popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre to promote Chinese nationalism, 
inculcate anti-Japanese sentiments among the masses, and serve its domestic 
political agenda. I will also explain how the PRC’s foreign policy towards 
Japan has shaped both types of memories. I shall further explore the mutual 
relationship between popular memories and official memories of the Nanjing 
Massacre in China, and the nature of these popular memories. 
 
Sino-Japanese Tensions and Chinese Nationalism 
Notwithstanding their improved relations after diplomatic normalisation in 
1972, it was a “thin” reconciliation for China and Japan as history issues soon 
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resurfaced to undermine their bilateral ties.
1
 Indeed, the “honeymoon” period 
over the past decade came to an end with the outbreak of the Japanese history 
textbook controversy in 1982. In June that year, the Japanese press reported 
that the Ministry of Education had revised high school history textbooks to 
downplay Japan’s invasion of China. For instance, the phase “shinryaku 
(invade and plunder)” was replaced by “shinshutsu (advance)”. The 300,000 
death toll of the Nanjing Massacre was also apparently deleted. Though the 
reports were later proven to be false, China condemned Japan for attempting 
to resurrect wartime militarism.
2
 It was the first time since the war ended in 
1945 that Beijing had protested to Tokyo over history issues.
3
 Chinese anger 
over Japanese attempts to whitewash its war history cumulated in the second 
half of 1985 when Chinese students protested against Japanese Prime Minister 
Nakasone Yasuhiro’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.4 A young Chinese 
intellectual angrily claimed that Japan’s war crimes would “be remembered 
forever” (original emphasis) by his compatriots.5 Another Chinese youth 
described Japanese atrocities in Nanjing as “bestial”.6 Popular memories of the 
Nanjing Massacre, which had long been marginalised, were gradually revived 
as Sino-Japanese relations worsened.  
    
China’s animosity towards Japan continued to increase throughout the 1980s 
over history issues. Japanese Education Minister Fujio Masayuki earned 
                                                 
1 David A. Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework”, Ethics and 
International Affairs, 13, 1 (March 1999), p. 60. 
2 Chalmers Johnson, “The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952-1982”, Pacific 
Affairs, 59, 3 (Autumn 1986), pp. 420-424. 
3 He, “History, Chinese Nationalism”, p. 6. 
4 Whiting, China Eyes Japan, pp. 53-54, and 66-79.  
5 Ibid., p. 78. 
6 Ibid., p. 77. 
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Beijing’s wrath in September 1986 when he urged Japanese cabinet ministers 
to visit the Yasukuni Shrine. He also defended the Imperial Japanese Army’s 
wartime actions in Nanjing and its invasion of China.
7
 In the following year, 
Chinese fears of a possible revival of Japanese militarism were heightened 
when Japan’s defence expenditure exceeded one percent of its gross national 
product.
8
 Chinese students meanwhile denounced increased Japanese 
economic penetration of China as “the second invasion”.9 Besides history 
issues, one reason for the growth of Chinese hostility towards Japan was 
China’s tendency to view its relations with Japan through the lenses of the 
traditional Sino-centric world order. Although this ancient world order no 
longer existed, the Chinese still perceived themselves to be culturally superior 
to the Japanese.
10
 Thus, history issues reminded the Chinese of Japan’s past 
disrespect for their country, which they resented. Peter Gries sums up the 
nature of Sino-Japanese relations by stating unambiguously that it was 
“decidedly not possible to speak about a genuine Chinese ‘friendship’ for 
Japan” (original emphasis).11  
 
Tensions with Japan added political pressure on Deng Xiaoping who faced 
various domestic challenges that undermined the CCP’s political legitimacy, 
such as corruption, party conservatives’ opposition to his economic reforms, 
and the spread of Western liberal values among young Chinese. Hence, he had 
to adopt a hard-line stance towards Japan, which was detrimental to PRC-
                                                 
7 Kyodo in English, “Nakasone Fires Fujio”, in United States Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service Daily Report: Asia and Pacific, 08 September 1986`, pp. C2-C3, and Whiting, China 
Eyes Japan, pp. 63-64. 
8 Whiting, China Eyes Japan, pp. 134-135. 
9 Ibid., p. 6. 
10 Gries, China’s New Nationalism, pp. 37, and 40. 
11 Ibid., p. 10. 
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Japan ties, in order to consolidate his rule, unite the party, and reduce popular 
dissatisfaction with his government.
12
 In a speech to Japanese visitors in May 
1987, Deng warned against the revival of Japanese militarism by a “very small 
minority (jishaoshu)” of Japanese who were not representative of the peace-
loving and China-friendly population.
13
 He also put the blame squarely on 
Japan for bilateral tensions when he told Japanese politicians one month later 
that, “[n]ot one of the past and present troubles was caused by China.”14 Deng 
further reminded Japan in May 1989 that because of Japanese aggression, 
“Japan owed China the largest amount of historical debt”.15 Chinese 
politicians and diplomats followed Deng’s lead by downplaying China-Japan 




As part of his plan to promote Chinese nationalism and oppose Japanese 
militarism, Deng revived memories of the Nanjing Massacre throughout the 
latter half of the 1980s. In 1987, which was the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Nanjing Massacre and the outbreak of full-scale war between China and Japan, 
the state-run press gave extensive coverage to the massacre and other Japanese 
war atrocities. These reports highlighted Chinese suffering and largely 
reinforced anti-Japanese feelings among the masses.
17
 The party-state also 
constructed the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall in 1985 in memory of the 
                                                 
12 He, “Remembering and Forgetting”, pp. 51-54. 
13 Deng Xiaoping邓小平, “Jingti Riben Jishaoshu Ren Fuhuo Junguo Zhuyi 警惕日本极少数
人复活军国主义 [Be Vigilant against the Revival of Japanese Militarism by a Small Minority 
of Japanese People], 05 May 1987”, in Deng Xiaoping 邓小平, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan邓小
平文选 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping] (Hong Kong: Renmin Chubanshe and Sanlian 
Shudian (Xianggang) Youxian Gongsi (Joint Publishing (H.K.) Co., Ltd.), 1996), pp. 385-386. 
14 Whiting, China Eyes Japan, p. 149. 
15 Deng Xiaoping邓小平, “Jieshu Guoqu, Kaipi Weilai 结束过去，开辟未来 [Ending the 
Past, Starting the Future], 16 May 1989”, in Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, p. 423. 
16 James Reilly, “Remember History, Not Hatred: Collective Remembrance of China’s War of 
Resistance to Japan”, Modern Asian Studies, 45, 2 (March 2011), p. 472. 
17 Whiting, China Eyes Japan, pp. 168-179. 
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massacre victims. In the intellectual field, the CCP regime sponsored the 
publication of large numbers of books on the Nanjing Massacre. Academic 
projects were carried out to interview massacre survivors and their testimonies 
were published for the first time. Documentaries and films on the subject were 
produced too.
  
These state-supported initiatives merged popular memories of 
the Japanese atrocities with official memories, making both types of memories 
indistinguishable from each other.
18
   
 
The revival of Chinese memories of the Nanjing Massacre became part of the 
CCP’s patriotic education campaign. The fall of communism in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe in 1989-1991, as well as the pro-democracy student 
demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in June 1989 severely weakened the 
party’s political legitimacy. In order to perpetuate its rule, Deng launched the 
patriotic education campaign in August 1991 to cultivate the loyalty of the 
Chinese citizenry. He realised the importance of educating Chinese youths 
about their country’s “century of humiliation”, and the CCP’s achievements in 
defeating Japanese imperialism and building a new and strong China. The 
campaign rejected the old victor narrative but emphasised Chinese victimhood 
under Japanese militarism. More importantly, by portraying itself as the 
leading nationalistic force against Japanese imperialists during the War of 
Resistance, the CCP was able to re-legitimise its rule.
19
 Japan henceforth 
became China’s Number One enemy, and possessing anti-Japanese sentiments 
                                                 
18 Sun, Chengqing Lishi, pp. 370-379. For an example of a state-sponsored publication of 
Nanjing Massacre survivors’ oral testimonies, see Nanjing Datusha Shiliao Bianji Weiyuanhui
南京大屠杀'史料编辑委员会 ed., Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shiliao侵华日军南京大
屠杀史料 (Source Materials Relating to the Horrible Massacre Committed by the Japanese 
Troops in Nanjing in December 1937) (Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1985). 
19 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, pp. 93-94, 96-97, 99-100, 102, and 120. 
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was “quintessential patriotism”.20 CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin had 
earlier highlighted in July 1990 that the Nanjing Massacre was a good 
example to teach students the “century of humiliation”. He had also proposed 
that school textbooks be written on this topic.
21
 “Education on national 
humiliation (guochi jiaoyu)” thus became an indispensable component of 
China’s education system.22 A major objective of the patriotic education 
campaign was to create official memories of the Nanjing Massacre which a 
teachers’ guidebook described as one of Japan’s “bestial crimes against 
humanity”.23 This state-led campaign instilled a sense of patriotism among the 
younger generation by exposing them to Japanese atrocities and arousing their 
emotional hatred of Japan.
24
 The patriotic education campaign appeared to be 
successful. The results of an opinion poll published by Zhongguo Qingnian 
Bao (China Youth Daily) in February 1997 indicated that eighty-four percent 




The patriotic education campaign coincided with the replacement of 
communism with nationalism or patriotism as the CCP’s main ideology. Jiang, 
who succeeded Deng as paramount leader, formalised the CCP’s 
transformation from a Marxist party to a nationalistic party. Jiang declared in 
                                                 
20 He, “Remembering and Forgetting”, p. 59. 
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May 1990 that patriotism and socialism were compatible. Therefore, 
supporting the ruling party was equivalent to being loyal to China.
26
 He also 
proclaimed six years later that the CCP had “made the greatest sacrifices and 
contributions in the struggle to win national independence and safeguard state 
sovereignty”.27 He added that being role models, “Chinese Communists are 
[sic] the staunchest and most consummate patriots” of the country.28 The CCP 
abandoned its Marxist ideology in September 1997 when it renounced its 
long-held tenet of public ownership of land and property.
29
 Jiang further 
claimed in February 2000 that the party represented “the fundamental interests 
of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people”.30 This meant that it was 
no longer a proletarian party, but a party for all Chinese regardless of social 
class.
31
 In July the following year, Jiang reminded Chinese citizens that the 
CCP ended the “century of humiliation”, built a strong and rejuvenated China, 
and protected its territorial sovereignty. In short, the party deserved full credit, 
and hence full support from the people, for China’s achievements since 
1949.
32
 Thomas J. Christensen best summarises the change in the CCP’s 
ideology when he writes,  
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[N]ationalism is the sole ideological glue that holds the People’s 
Republic together and keeps the CCP government in power. Since the 





China’s relations with Japan remained largely tense in the 1990s. On 15 
August 1995, which was the fiftieth anniversary of the end the Second World 
War in Asia-Pacific, Socialist and non-LDP Prime Minister Murayama 
Tomiichi offered an official apology for the war. He expressed his “deep 
remorse” and “heartfelt apology” for Japan’s invasion of Asian-Pacific 
territories and for the suffering it inflicted upon their people.
34
 Yinan He 
describes this apology as “the most unequivocal, unconditional, and complete 
expression of contrition offered by Japan to date”.35 While Beijing accepted 
the apology, it remained dissatisfied with Tokyo’s attitude towards history 
issues. China, which still perceived itself as culturally superior to Japan, 
remained antagonistic towards inferior Japan for the wartime trauma that it 
caused to the Chinese. Such long-standing resentment made it difficult “for an 
apology to heal the wound to Chinese self-esteem”.36 China tried but failed to 
seek another formal apology from Japan when Jiang visited Tokyo in 
November 1998. In anger, Jiang repeatedly lectured the Japanese on history 
issues throughout his state visit, which soured Sino-Japanese ties.
37
 For 
example, he blamed Japan for causing bilateral tensions over history issues, 
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warned against right-wing Japanese politicians’ and intellectuals’ denial of the 




PRC-Japan relations hardly improved in the first fifteen years of the twenty-
first century. Top Chinese leaders refused to hold any summit meetings with 
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro as they opposed his annual visits 
to the Yasukuni Shrine from 2001 to 2006.
39
 It did not help that Jiang and his 
younger cohort of Chinese leaders were less knowledgeable of Japan than 
their predecessors, and they did not appreciate the sensitivities and delicacy of 
Sino-Japanese ties.
40
 Moreover, another Japanese history textbook controversy 
broke out in April 2005 when a new right-wing history textbook only briefly 
mentioned the Nanjing Massacre in a footnote.
41
 In protest, the CCP regime 
sponsored the publication of archival documents, including Nanjing Massacre 
survivors’ oral history testimonies, to rebut Japanese conservatives’ claims 
that the massacre was a fabrication.
42
 The textbook controversy also led to 
widespread anti-Japanese protests, which were the largest since diplomatic 
normalisation in 1972, across twenty Chinese provinces. The demonstrations 
lasted for three weeks with Japanese residents and diplomatic missions 
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becoming targets of mass attacks.
 43 
Sino-Japanese relations have remained 
tense since right-wing LDP leader Abe Shinzo became Japan’s Prime Minister 
in December 2012. Chinese leaders are presently still wary of his reluctance to 
apologise for Japan’s war atrocities and his attempts to revise the country’s 
pacifist constitution.
44
 In response, the ruling CCP designated 13 December 
2014, which was the seventy-seventh anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre, as 
“National Memorial Day” to reinforce official memories of the atrocities.45 In 
a state memorial service on that day, President Xi Jinping described the 
massacre as “a horrendous crime against humanity and a very dark page in the 
history of mankind”, and he urged Japan to acknowledge its wartime past.46 
 
China’s deteriorating relations with Japan were accompanied by the 
development of anti-Japanese nationalism among the masses. The patriotic 
education campaign and the growth in the number of popular anti-Japanese 
websites increased public awareness of Japanese war atrocities.
47
 This 
generated anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese populace, which led to 
frequent anti-Japanese protests.
48
 Jiyoung Choi describes the nature of post-
1980s Chinese nationalism as a form of “resistant nationalism” which occurs 
in countries that experienced foreign imperialism. As a result of the Japanese 
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invasion, shared memories of wartime victimhood continue to persist in 
Chinese society long after the war ended. This collective consciousness of war 
suffering thus contributes to an enduring form of Chinese nationalism.
49
 Some 
Chinese intellectuals responded by calling for a restraint in popular anti-
Japanese feelings in the interests of enhancing Sino-Japanese ties. Their ideas 
became known as the “New Thinking (xin siwei)”. Journalist Ma Licheng and 
political scientist Shi Yinhong urged the CCP government in 2002 and 2003 
respectively to accept past Japanese apologies for the war, put aside history 
issues, and seek closer economic cooperation with Japan.
50
 However, the 
“New Thinking” advocates earned a backlash from the Chinese citizenry. For 
instance, Ma was forced to leave for Hong Kong after facing death threats for 
his alleged disloyalty to China.
51
 The rise of popular anti-Japanese nationalism 
was reflected in a survey conducted by the South Korean daily, Kyunghyang 
Shinmun, in 2005. Its findings showed that the percentage of Chinese 
respondents who distrusted Japan rose by sixteen percent from sixty-seven 
percent in 2003 to eighty-three percent in 2005.
52
 Furthermore, an annual 
opinion poll conducted by a Chinese paper, China Daily, and a Japanese think 
tank, Genron NPO, in 2014 showed that 86.8 percent of Chinese respondents 
had a negative impression of Japan, which was the second highest figure since 
the survey started in 2005. Most of these respondents cited “the issue of 
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On the other hand, though political animosities existed between China and 
Japan, both neighbours enjoyed close economic cooperation, and the Chinese 
populace retained positive impressions of Japan. After Deng launched his 
economic reforms and opened up China to foreign investments in 1979, Japan 
provided loans and Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the PRC to 
help develop Chinese industries and infrastructure. Between 1979 and 1995, 
Japan’s total amount of loans to China reached US$10 billion, while the 
cumulated amount of ODA to China between 1979 and 2002 was worth at 
least US$19 billion.
54
 Besides ODA, Japan’s foreign direct investment in the 
PRC rose rapidly from US$100 million in 1985 to approximately US$6.9 
billion in 2009.
55
 Sino-Japanese bilateral trade also grew simultaneously, with 
its total value increasing from around US$19 billion in 1985 to an estimated 
US$266.4 billion in 2008.
56
 Moreover, the Chinese public had not forgotten 
the importance of Sino-Japanese friendship. Online forums and surveys 
conducted between 2000 and 2005 indicated that a majority of the Chinese 
populace had positive perceptions of Japan and supported closer China-Japan 
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bilateral ties. The more they knew about Japan, the greater their positive 
sentiments were.
57
 Trends from annual opinion polls conducted between 2005 
and 2010 indicated that although over half of the Chinese respondents had 
negative impressions of Japan, these negative impressions declined from 62.9 
percent to 55.9 percent, while positive impressions rose from 11.6 percent to 
38.3 percent. More than half of the Chinese respondents also believed that 
history issues would be settled as bilateral relations progressed. The 
proportion of respondents who shared this view fluctuated between 50.1 
percent and 57.7 percent from 2005 to 2010.
58
 Notwithstanding close 
economic ties with Japan and positive images of the Japanese, considerable 
anti-Japanese feelings among the Chinese masses are still present due to the 
confluence of popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre with official 
memories and Chinese nationalism.  
 
State-influenced Popular Memories of the Nanjing Massacre 
The nationalistic CCP has played a leading role in the development of official 
memories of the Nanjing Massacre since 1982. Anne F. Thurston rightly 
asserts that “[m]emory has become politicized since 1949. The [Chinese] 
Communist Party has served as the official mediator of both collective and 
individual memory [sic]”.59 The CCP decides what memories should be 
remembered, what memories should be forgotten, and what narratives should 
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be created to suit the remembered memories.
60
 In its construction of official 
memories, the party-state has endorsed the War of Resistance, particularly 
Chinese victimhood under Japanese militarism, as one of China’s chosen 
traumas.
61
 Vamik Volkan defines “chosen traumas” as a manifestation of a 
group’s inability to overcome the distressing loss and humiliation which it 
experienced in the past. Through intergenerational transmission of these 
traumatic memories, the group subconsciously internalises them into its own 
identity. This identity is characterised by its attempts to avenge its earlier loss 
and humiliation.
62
 The patriotic education campaign’s emphasis on the 
“century of humiliation”, the victimisation narrative, and the 300,000 official 
death toll figure have hence turned the Nanjing Massacre into the PRC’s 
chosen trauma. Besides being a major symbol of China’s national identity,63 
the massacre has become “incomparable and unforgettable” in Chinese 
historical and national consciousness.
64
 Ian Buruma sums up China’s official 
memories and chosen trauma when he describes the Nanjing Massacre as the 
“shorthand for the unique barbarity of Japanese militarism”.65 It is a statement 
which Chinese citizens and their political leaders are likely to agree with. 
 
Official memories of the Nanjing Massacre shape popular memories of the 
event. According to Volkan, objective facts do not matter in a chosen trauma 
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as its main purpose is to stir up emotions among the masses and unite them 
under the elite leadership in times of conflicts.
66
 This analysis explains the 
CCP regime’s manipulation of the Nanjing Massacre as a chosen trauma to 
generate popular memories of Japanese wartime atrocities and mobilise the 
Chinese masses against Japan whenever history issues plague bilateral ties. 
Therefore, anti-Japanese popular nationalism in China has been increasing in 
scale and frequency since the late 1990s.
67
 Gries cautions us not to equate 
popular nationalism with official nationalism as nationalism is no longer the 
CCP’s sole domain.68 As China becomes a more open society with rapid 
dissemination of information, the ruling party is unable to control popular 
nationalism, and it cannot disregard public opinion which contains strong anti-
Japanese sentiments.
69
 Such popular anti-Japanese nationalism and public 
opinion are the result of the development of Chinese popular memories of the 
Nanjing Massacre, which are in turn shaped by official memories. Popular 
nationalism has given rise to Internet-savvy Chinese youths, known as 
“fenqing (indignant young people)” in popular parlance, who have become the 
most virulent anti-Japanese nationalists in the PRC.
70
 They were responsible 
for mobilising protesters through the Internet to participate in the mass anti-
Japanese demonstrations in April 2005.
71
 The spread of online information 
and knowledge has therefore further entrenched China’s chosen trauma and 
popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre.
72
 Popular nationalism has also 
forced the CCP to take public opinion into account when formulating its 
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foreign policy towards Japan.
73
 At the same time, the party-state is capable of 
controlling, and even reversing, public opinion towards Japan.
74
 Restraining 
popular nationalism is necessary as the mass anti-Japanese protests in April 
2005 had shown that ordinary Chinese nationalists were more radical than the 
CCP had expected, as their actions had threatened the country’s stability and 




Popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre are deeply entrenched in Chinese 
public consciousness. These memories have also been passed down across 
generations within China’s numerous families. Older generations of Chinese 
who experienced war suffering have told their stories to younger generations. 
Through such intergenerational transmission of memories, Chinese youths are 
able to relate both to their elders’ memories and the government’s official 
memories of the massacre that are propagated by the patriotic education 
campaign.
76
 These memories have developed into Chinese youths’ own 
memories even though they personally experienced neither the Nanjing 
Massacre nor the War of Resistance. Marianne Hirsch labels such memories as 
“postmemories”.77 Thus, popular memories of Japanese wartime atrocities 
have become deeply ingrained in the minds of the Chinese populace, and these 
memories are reflected in Nanjing Massacre survivors’ published oral history 
testimonies. 
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Owing to the pervasive influence of official memories which stress Chinese 
victimhood, popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre are generally 
homogeneous and distressing in nature. In their published oral history 
testimonies, massacre survivors recounted their harrowing encounters with the 
Imperial Japanese Army, the physical injuries and mental trauma that they 
suffered, and the atrocities which they witnessed. From a psychological 
perspective, these traumatic war memories would be deeply etched in the 
survivors’ minds for the rest of their lives.78 For instance, Yan Hongliang was 
able to provide a detailed account of his narrow escape from death in an oral 
history interview conducted by the Nanjing city government in 1984. After the 
fall of Nanjing in December 1937, the Japanese military arrested Yan along 
with 3,000 more Chinese civilians, and brought them to a river bank where 
there were tens of thousands more civilians. The Japanese soldiers executed 
most of them using machine guns, before throwing their corpses into the river. 
Yan was stabbed in his stomach, but he fortunately survived. He hid near the 
execution site for several days, before returning home when he felt safe.
79
 
Similarly, sixteen-year-old Xu Qi managed to avoid the Japanese when they 
came to his neighbourhood. However, he witnessed the soldiers arresting his 
younger brother and many of his peers. He believed that they were 
subsequently executed as he heard gun shots and saw countless dead bodies in 
nearby lakes, which turned the water red. As a result, Xu found it difficult to 
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forgive the Japanese, and continued to harbour hatred towards them. 
Nonetheless, being influenced by official memories, he echoed the CCP 
government in urging Japan to acknowledge its wartime past and stressed the 




Popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre are so deeply embedded in 
Chinese society that even those who were barely a year old in 1937 were able 
to animatedly describe the suffering which their parents and other family 
members underwent at the hands of the Japanese military. An example is 
Wang Changhua who wrote down his family’s war experiences in 1995. 
Although he was only three months old in 1937, Wang was able to vividly 
describe how the Japanese “devils” brutally killed his father.81 From a 
psychological viewpoint, it was probably not possible for him to remember the 
Japanese atrocities from such a young age. Research has shown that people are 
capable of remembering events only upon reaching three to five years of age 
when the parts of the brain responsible for retaining memories develop. This 
means that people do not have any memories when they are younger than 
three to five years old.
82
 Therefore, it was likely that Wang heard the story of 
his father being murdered from his mother, his father’s friends, or his 
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neighbours. This case study reflects the intergenerational transmission of war 
memories from the older generation to the younger generation in China, which 
helps to keep popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre alive.  
 
In addition, as further evidence of the pervasiveness of popular memories of 
the Nanjing Massacre in the PRC, war survivors, despite having not resided in 
Nanjing in 1937, could claim to “remember” the massacre, or recount 
Japanese atrocities in the fallen capital based on second-hand or even third-
hand knowledge. Yan Qihua told her oral history interviewers in 2006 that she 
was a peasant who lived in Anhui province in 1937. She moved to Nanjing, 
which borders Anhui, only after she was married in 1943. Hence, she neither 
experienced nor witnessed the Nanjing Massacre. However, based on what she 
heard from her neighbour, Yan could narrate the cruel manner in which 
Japanese soldiers executed ordinary civilians by machine guns.
83
 Her 
recollections exemplify Maurice Halbwachs’ argument that individuals 
construct their own memories based on the collective memories in the group 
or society which they belong to.
84
 Therefore, every war survivor in China has 
his or her own individual memories of the Nanjing Massacre, which 
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This chapter has shown that the CCP government has been relying on both 
official memories and popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre since 1982 
to serve its domestic political agenda and influence its foreign policy towards 
Japan. The outbreak of the Japanese history textbook controversy in 1982 
ended the decade-long “honeymoon” period in PRC-Japan relations, reignited 
Chinese nationalism among the masses, and revived popular memories of the 
Nanjing Massacre. Facing internal political pressure, the CCP took the 
opportunity presented by the textbook controversy to oppose a return of 
Japanese militarism and imperialism. Following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and its Eastern European satellite states between 1989 and 1991, 
communism was rejected as a viable political ideology internationally. As a 
result, the Chinese party-state was forced to stress official and popular 
memories of the Nanjing Massacre through the patriotic education campaign 
that was launched in 1991. The campaign’s focus on the “century of 
humiliation” and Chinese wartime victimisation under the Japanese promoted 
Chinese nationalism among the people. This has contributed to the growth of 
anti-Japanese feelings in China which directly shape popular memories of the 
Nanjing Massacre. They have become largely indistinguishable from official 
memories, and are generally homogeneous in emphasising Chinese 
victimhood and suffering. More importantly, the CCP regime’s championing 
of Chinese nationalism has given it the legitimacy to continue governing 
China. Nevertheless, anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese populace 
have worsened China’s bilateral ties with Japan. As of 2015, unresolved 
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CHINESE POPULAR MEMORIES OF 
THE SOOK CHING MASSACRE IN SINGAPORE, 1980-2015 
 
The launch of the “Learn from Japan” campaign in 1980 was an important 
milestone in Singapore’s relations with Japan. Cordial and warm bilateral ties 
have continued to develop even after the campaign ended by 1990. 
Nonetheless, Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre have 
persisted in Singapore from 1980 to 2015, with an increasing number of first-
hand accounts of the atrocities and the Japanese Occupation being published. 
The PAP government has also developed official memories of Sook Ching and 
the Syonan years from 1984 to promote a sense of national identity among 
Singaporeans. This chapter will therefore assess the development of popular 
memories and official memories of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore, the 
differences between both types of memories, the reasons for these differences, 
and the extent to which official memories shape popular memories. The 
influence of the ruling party’s nation-building agenda, its “Learn from Japan” 
campaign, and Singapore’s foreign relations with Japan on the nature of these 
popular memories shall also be discussed. 
 
Cordial and Growing Singapore-Japan Relations 
The “Learn from Japan” campaign deepened Singapore-Japan post-war 
relations throughout the 1980s. After undergoing a recession in the 1970s, 
Singapore had to restructure its economy by abandoning its labour-intensive 
and low value-added industries in favour of capital-intensive and high value-
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added ones. The PAP administration decided to model its economic 
restructuring after Asia’s economic powerhouse – Japan.1 Lee Kuan Yew 
personally felt that Japan was “still equivocal and evasive” 2  in apologising 
for its war atrocities, and he urged it to do so in order to build trust and 
advance its bilateral relations with other Asian countries.
3
 Nevertheless, his 
admiration for Japan and its post-war economic miracle outweighed his 
concerns about Japanese attitudes towards history issues.
4
 He extolled the 
Japanese people as “disciplined, hardworking, united and efficient”.5 He was 
particularly keen to learn from Japan to improve Singapore’s industrial 
productivity as part of the city-state’s economic restructuring. Lee thus 
initiated the “Learn from Japan” campaign in 1980, a year after visiting 
Japan.
6
 Besides adopting Japan’s Quality Control Circles (QCC) to raise 
productivity through positive work attitudes and team effort, Singapore 
accepted a grant of US$20 million from Japan to finance the Productivity 
Movement from 1983 to 1990.
7 
Besides increasing productivity, Japan advised 
Singapore in 1980 to build a knowledge-based and technologically-driven 
economy, as exemplified by the setting up of the Singapore-Japan Institute of 
                                                 
1 Thang Leng Leng, and S. K. Gan, “The ‘Learn from Japan’ Campaign in Singapore”, in 
Japan and Singapore: A Multidisciplinary Approach, ed. Tsu Yun Hui (Singapore: McGraw-
Hill, 2006), p. 260. 
2 Lee, From Third World to First, p. 573 
3 Ibid., p. 578. 
4 Ibid., pp. 557-558. 
5 Ibid., p. 581. 
6 Lee Kuan Yew, “Press Conference held in Tokyo, Japan (23 October 1979)”, in The Papers 
of Lee Kuan Yew: Speeches, Interviews, and Dialogues, Vol. 8: 1978-1980, eds. Julia Chee, 
Fan Wenjun, Ng Yoke Lin, Tan Bee Leng, June Lin, and Joanne Yip (Singapore: Gale Asia, 
2012), pp. 384-387, and Lee Kuan Yew, “Interview with Mr. Kazuo Nishi, Managing Editor 
of Mainichi Shimbun, at the Istana, Singapore (12 September 1980)”, in The Papers of Lee 
Kuan Yew, Vol. 8, pp. 498-499. 
7 Thang, and Gan, “The ‘Learn from Japan’ Campaign”, p. 269, and National Productivity 
Board, “Strategies for Productivity Improvement: Learning from the Japanese Experience – an 




Software Technology in the following year.
8
 In 1981, the National University 
of Singapore established the Department of Japanese Studies to nurture local 
Japan specialists.
9
 The total number of Japanese Studies majors rose annually, 
from fifty-four in academic year 1981/1982 to 639 in 2000/2001.
10
 The “Learn 
from Japan” campaign was so ubiquitous that Robin Ramcharan claims that 
“no other country surpasses Singapore in its public admiration of Japan”.11  
 
The “Learn from Japan” campaign ended by 1990 when the Japanese 
economy entered a long-drawn recession, and it was therefore no longer a 
viable model for Singapore.  Moreover, the implementation of the QCC was 
not as successful as the PAP government envisioned it to be due to differences 
in culture, work ethics, and educational levels between Singapore and Japan.
12
 
The city-state had also begun to cultivate economic relations with other Asian 
states. Nonetheless, Singapore and Japan still maintained close economic and 
cultural ties. In 1995, Japanese investments in the republic cumulated to 
S$933 million (US$644 million) which was the largest after American 
investments.
13
 The number of Japanese firms in Singapore also grew from 
around 900 in 1989 to 2,600 in the late 1990s.
14
 Furthermore, the number of 
Japanese tourists visiting the city-state increased from about 682,000 in 1988 
                                                 
8 Ramcharan, Singaporean Statehood, p. 189. 
9 Guo Junhai, “Teaching and Learning Japanese in Singapore”, in Japan and Singapore: A 
Multidisciplinary Approach, ed. Tsu Yun Hui (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2006), p. 288. 
10 Handbook of Department of Japanese Studies, National University of Singapore, cited in 
ibid., p. 296, Table 11.4. 
11 Ramcharan, Singaporean Statehood, back cover. 
12 Thang, and Gan, “The ‘Learn from Japan’ Campaign”, pp. 271-272. 
13 “Japanese presence on the rise” in “Country Spotlight: Japan: Commemorating the Birthday 
of H.M. Emperor Akihito”, “Sunday Review” section, The Sunday Times, 17 December 1995, 
p. 6. 
14 “Japan-S’pore ties on an even keel” in “Country Report: Japan” section, The Sunday Times, 
30 July 1989, p. 3, and Thang, and Gan, “The ‘Learn from Japan’ Campaign”, p. 278. 
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to approximately 1,094,000 in 1997.
15
 Bilateral economic ties were also 
enhanced with the signing of the Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement for a 
New Age Partnership in January 2002. This free trade agreement contributed 
to a rise in two-way trade reaching S$47.6 billion in 2013, with Japan 
becoming Singapore’s ninth largest trading partner.16 Furthermore, Japanese 
culture remained prevalent in the city-state. For example, there were as many 
as 12,000 Singaporeans, including students and adults, learning the Japanese 
language in 2003.
17
 The popularity of learning Japanese among young 
Singaporeans could be attributed to an influx of Japanese popular culture, 
ranging from fashion and food to songs and manga.
18
 Young Singaporeans’ 
love of all things Japanese was revealed in a local sociological survey in 
December 1999. 8.2 percent of Chinese secondary and tertiary students who 





Singapore’s relations with Japan since 1990 are best described by Prime 
Minister Lee Hsien Loong (Li Xianlong) as “excellent”.20 Both nations have 
                                                 
15 Singapore Tourism Board, Singapore Annual Report on Tourism Statistics 1997 (Singapore: 
Singapore Tourism Board, 1997), p. 24.  
16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, “Japan: Bilateral Relations”, 
http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/countries_and_region/northeast_asia/japan.html (accessed 
on 16 December 2014). 
17 Japan Foundation, 2003 Survey of Overseas Organizations Involved in Japanese-Language 
Education (Tokyo: Japan Foundation, 2003), cited in Guo, “Teaching and Learning Japanese”, 
p. 289. 
18 For a critique of Japanese cultural influences in Singapore, see Chua, “’Where got Japanese 
Influence in Singapore!’”, pp. 133-149.  
19 Sun Chuanwei 孙传炜, “Guoda Wenhua Jiazhiguan Chouyang Diaocha Xianshi: Sifenyi 
Huazu Xuesheng Buxiangzuo Huaren 国大文化价值观抽样调查显示：四分一华族学生不
想做华人 [National University of Singapore’s Sample Survey on Cultural Values Indicates 
that a Quarter of ChineseStudents Do Not Wish to be Chinese]”, Lianhe Zaobao, 04 
December 1999, p. 11. 
20 Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore, “Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 
19th Nikkei International Conference on the Future of Asia” (delivered on 23 May 2013), 
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benefited from economic cooperation, and unlike China, Singapore does not 
raise history issues, such as the Sook Ching Massacre, with Japan. When 
Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi visited Singapore in 1994, he was the first 
Japanese leader to lay a wreath at the Civilian War Memorial, and he did so 
voluntarily. The PAP administration appreciated his gesture and accepted his 
landmark August 1995 apology.
21
 Although Singapore has regularly expressed 
its “regret[s]” whenever Japanese prime ministers visit the Yasukuni Shrine, it 
stops short of condemning these visits.
22
 Lee Hsien Loong reemphasised 
Singapore’s traditional forward-looking foreign policy towards Japan in a 
speech in Tokyo in May 2013. He stressed that both states should “look 
forward to a better future together, and not rehash old grievances or reopen old 
wounds”.23 Hence, both official and popular memories of Sook Ching have not 
hindered Singapore’s bilateral ties with Japan. 
 
Diverse Popular Memories of the Sook Ching Massacre 
Development of Official Memories 
The PAP government began developing official memories of the Sook Ching 
Massacre and the Japanese Occupation only in 1984 when Singapore 
celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary of full self-government.
24
 By then, the 
                                                                                                                                
http://www.pmo.gov.sg/mediacentre/speech-prime-minister-lee-hsien-loong-19th-nikkei-
international-conference-future-asia (accessed on 16 December 2014). 
21 Lee, From Third World to First, p. 577. The Memorial was unveiled in February 1967 to 
commemorate all who died during the Japanese Occupation, including Sook Ching victims. 
See Blackburn, and Hack, War, Memory, pp. 164-170. 
22 For example, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, “MFA Spokesman's Comments 
On Visit By Prime Minister Koizumi To The Yasukuni Shrine On 15 August 2006”, 
http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/pr/2006/200608/press_2006081
5.html (accessed on 16 December 2014). 
23 Prime Minister’s Office, “Speech”. 
24 A National Exhibition was held in November 1984 to raise public awareness of Singapore’s 
history for the first time. See Lee Kuan Yew, “A National Exhibition on Singapore’s 25 Years 
of Independence: Address at the Opening of the National Exhibition at the World Trade 
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city-state had attained sustained economic growth, and its survival as a 
sovereign nation was secured. The ruling party realised that remembering the 
country’s wartime past was important in instilling in young Singaporeans, who 
grew up in the peaceful post-independence years, a sense of national identity 
and collective belonging.
25
 As part of the state’s nation-building project, 
Singapore’s national history, which included Sook Ching and the Japanese 
Occupation, was introduced to the lower secondary school syllabus in 1984.
26
 
In the history textbooks written since then, the Japanese Occupation has 
always been portrayed as a “total disastrous period” for the people in 
Singapore.
27
 The creation of official memories of the Sook Ching Massacre 
did not contradict the PAP leadership’s “Learn from Japan” campaign and its 
policy of fostering close bilateral ties with Japan. Foreign policy was strictly 
kept separate from history issues.  
 
Singapore’s “excellent” ties with Japan did not preclude it from launching 
extensive public commemoration of the Japanese Occupation on the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Fall of Singapore in 1992, and on the fiftieth anniversary of 
the end of the Pacific War in 1995. The PAP administration wanted 
Singaporeans to remember the Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese 
                                                                                                                                
Centre (15 November 1984)”, in The Papers of Lee Kuan Yew: Speeches, Interviews, and 
Dialogues, Vol. 9: 1981-1987, eds. Julia Chee, Fan Wenjun, Ng Yoke Lin, Tan Bee Leng, 
June Lin, and Joanne Yip (Singapore: Gale Asia, 2012), pp. 358-359. 
25 Albert Lau, “The National Past and the Writing of the History of Singapore”, in Imagining 
Singapore, 2nd ed., ed. Ban Kah Choon, Anne Pakir, and Tong Chee Kiong (Singapore: 
Eastern Universities Press, 2004), pp. 38 -41, and Blackburn, and Hack, War, Memory, p. 294. 
26 Kevin Blackburn, “Mary Turnbull’s History Textbook for the Singapore Nation”, in 
Studying Singapore’s Past: C.M. Turnbull and the History of Modern Singapore, ed. Nicholas 
Tarling (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), pp. 73-76. 
27 Goh Chor Boon, “Things Japanese in Our History Syllabus: Implications for National 
Education”, in Securing Our Future: Sourcebook for National Education Ideas and Strategies 
for Secondary Schools and Junior Colleges, eds. Steven Tan Kwang San, and Goh Chor Boon 
(Singapore: Prentice Hall, 2003), p. 214. 
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Occupation in order to promote patriotism and national defence.
28
 Through 
television programmes and museum exhibitions, the state highlighted the 
theme of victimisation and common suffering by all races in Singapore under 
Japanese rule.
29
 The Syonan period henceforth became “a truly national 
‘collective memory’”.30 Pana News Agency conducted three surveys, namely 
in 1987, 1990, and 1995, to find out Singapore students’ attitudes towards 
Japan and the Japanese Occupation. The results of the 1987 and 1990 surveys 
indicated a decline in anti-Japanese attitudes among the respondents. However, 
the 1995 survey revealed that the respondents understood the importance of 
Singapore having a strong military to defend its sovereignty and protect its 
people. The results clearly proved that the government had achieved its 
objective of situating official memories of Sook Ching within the context of 
nation-building.
31
 In addition, popular memories of the Japanese Occupation 
continue to be passed down across generations in Singapore homes. 
Grandparents and parents who lived through the war have transmitted 
memories of Japanese war atrocities to their grandchildren and children who 
would retain and pass these memories down to their descendants.
32
 Like their 
counterparts in China, Singapore youths have developed postmemories of the 
war.
33
 Thus, Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre and the 
Japanese Occupation in Singapore have flourished alongside official memories.  
 
 
                                                 
28 Ramcharan, Singaporean Statehood, pp. 267-270. 
29 Blackburn, and Hack, War, Memory, pp. 301-312. 
30 Ibid., p. 301. 
31 Pana News Agency, “Opinion Survey”, 1987, 1990, 1995, all cited in Ramcharan, 
Singaporean Statehood, pp. 270-274. 
32 Ramcharan, Singaporean Statehood, p. 272. 
33 Hirsch, “Past Lives: Postmemories in Exile”, pp. 659-686. 
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Popular Memories: Overlap with Official Memories 
Between 1981 and 2015, works by Chinese war survivors who lived through 
the Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese Occupation were published, as 
seen in Table 2. Whilst some of these popular memories coincide with official 
memories, others are distinct from them. Moreover, like autobiographies and 
memoirs of war survivors that were published between 1961 and 1980, the 
nature of the first-hand accounts of Sook Ching and the Syonan years that 
published from 1981 onwards varied. Some of these works emphasised 
Japanese atrocities and contained anti-Japanese feelings, but the rest focussed 
on the less brutal aspects of the event and did not necessarily express 
emotional hatred towards the Japanese. 
 
Table 2: Number of Published Autobiographies, Biographies, Memoirs, and 




Language of Publication 1981-2000 2001-2015 
English Language 23 34 
Chinese Language 6 7 
Total 29 41 
 
Autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, and published oral history interviews 
of Sook Ching survivors proliferated after 1980. For works published between 
1981 and 2000, some authors stressed Japanese atrocities and expressed anti-
Japanese sentiments,
35
 while the rest put the traumatic episode behind them 
and portrayed the Japanese Occupation in less emotional terms.
36
 The latter 
group of survivors might have been influenced by the “Learn from Japan” 
                                                 
34 Refer to the Appendix 2 for the authors, titles, and publication details of these works. 
35 See, for example, Qu Rubo区如柏, Lunxian Suiyue 沦陷岁月 [Years of Occupation] 
(Singapore: Shengyou Shuju (Seng Yew Book Store), 1993), pp. 45-53. 
36 See, for instance, Peter H.L. Wee, From Farm and Kampong (Singapore: Graham Brash, 
1989), pp. 2-38. 
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campaign and had thus cultivated a higher regard for Japan and its economic 
successes.
37
 As Table 2 has shown, more first-hand accounts by Sook Ching 
survivors were published in the fifteen years between 2001 and 2015 than in 
the preceding twenty years from 1981 to 2000, most likely because most war 
survivors had reached old age, and they felt the need to record their life 
experiences for posterity. A few of these works still contained anti-Japanese 
feelings,
38
 whereas such emotional sentiments were almost non-existent in 
most of them. The massacre was merely one of the many episodes in these 
survivors’ life stories, and it was not the most significant.39 All these first-hand 
accounts reflected Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre 
which complement our knowledge of Singapore’s official memories of the 
event. In addition, some popular memories overlap with official memories, 
while others do not. Popular memories that are similar to state-sanctioned ones 
belong to families whose kin were among the dead victims, those who 
survived the massacre, those who “passed” the screening, or those who 
escaped from the screening centres unharmed. For these survivors, memories 
of Sook Ching form a predominant part of their autobiographies, biographies, 
memoirs, and published oral history interviews. Examples of such popular 
memories which overlap with official memories are discussed below.  
 
Firstly, Chinese civilians, especially women, whose close family members 
died in the Sook Ching Massacre, vividly remembered the trauma which they 
                                                 
37 Pang Cheng Lian, “Gaining from Japan’s experience”, New Nation, 11 January 1974, p. 8. 
38 For example, see H. Sidhu, The Bamboo Fortress: True Singapore War Stories (Singapore: 
Native Publications, 1991). 
39 For instance, see Arthur Lim, and Tan Mei Ching,. From A Doctor’s Diary (Singapore: PG 
Lim, 1999), pp. 15-36, and Ooi Kee Beng, Serving a New Nation: Baey Lian Peck’s 
Singapore Story (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), pp. 5-13. 
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and their kin endured. Lim San Neo, who was only twenty-one years old in 
1942, was grief-stricken when her husband, her father, and her eldest brother 
were killed during the carnage.
40
 “That was the saddest moment in my life,” 
the mother of three declared in her autobiography.
41
 The same fate befell on 
Siew Fong Fung whose husband reported to the screening centre at Victoria 
School but never came back. Along with her eight children, she waited in vain 
for his return, sold her possessions to bribe Japanese soldiers for information, 
and sought Japanese welfare officer Shinozaki Mamoru’s42 help, but to no 
avail.
43
 He Shujuan’s husband and her younger brother were also Sook Ching 
victims. She initially hoped that they were sent elsewhere to do hard labour 
and would eventually return, but they did not. In order to seek justice for her 
family, she testified at the 1947 Chinese Massacre Trial as a prosecution 
witness. At the time of her oral history interview in 1992, He Shujuan still had 
bitter memories of the Japanese atrocities and had not forgiven the 
perpetrators.
44
 Other Chinese civilians who shared similar painful memories of 
losing their loved ones during the Sook Ching Massacre remained antagonistic 




Secondly, a few Sook Ching victims, like Zheng Guangyu whom I have 
mentioned in Chapter Two, managed to survive the massacre and lived to 
narrate their traumatic experiences. Among them was former SSVF member 
                                                 
40 Lim San Neo, My Life, My Memories, My Story: Recollections of a 75-year old Great-
Grandmother (Singapore: Epic Management Services Pte Ltd., [1997?]), pp. 56-58. 
41 Ibid., p. 58. 
42 Shinozaki was a prominent Japanese civilian officer in Syonan who saved the lives of many 
potential Sook Ching victims. See Shinozaki, Syonan, pp. 16-24. 
43 Wong Moh Keed ed., To My Heart with Smiles: The Love Letters of Siew Fung Fong and 
Wan Kwai Pik (1920-1941) (Singapore: Landmark Books, 1988), pp. 118-119. 
44 Qu, Lunxian Suiyue, pp. 61-65. 
45 See, for example, Huang Dali黄大礼, Xuebei Buyi血碑补遗 [Addendum to a Blood Stele] 
(Singapore: Xinjiapo Qingnian Shuju (The Youth Book Company), 2008), pp. 93-103. 
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Chan Cheng Yean who described his escape from an execution site in Bedok 
in an interview with the Oral History Department in 1992.
46
 He reported to a 
screening centre at Tanjong Katong, before being driven to Bedok with eighty-
nine other civilians to be killed. Though his knee was shot, he survived the 
execution. He managed to escape from the pool of corpses after the Japanese 
firing squad left.
47
 First-hand accounts such as Chan’s form an integral part of 
Singapore’s official and popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre. They 
reflect Japanese brutality and Chinese victimhood which are essential nation-
building elements of the state-endorsed historical narrative – the Singapore 
Story.  
 
Thirdly, although those who “passed” the Sook Ching screening did not 
personally experience the Japanese atrocities, they had memories of their 
apprehensive experiences at the screening centres. Their wit, however, enabled 
them to emerge safely from these centres. The most well-known account of a 
Chinese civilian who “passed” the screening was that of a young Lee Kuan 
Yew who later became Singapore’s first prime minister. In his memoirs, he 
described his experiences at the Jalan Besar screening centre as “a narrow 
escape”.48 Lee initially “failed” the screening, but a Kempeitai soldier allowed 
                                                 
46 Chan’s oral history interview is representative of most interviews conducted by the Oral 
History Department (presently known as the Oral History Centre at the National Archives of 
Singapore). Like other interviewees’ memories of the Sook Ching Massacre, his memories of 
the event overlap with Singapore’s official memories. Notwithstanding Kevin Blackburn’s 
criticisms of these state-conducted oral history interviews in Singapore, I believe that they are 
still relevant in deriving insights into Chinese popular memories of Sook Ching in Singapore. 
See Kevin Blackburn, “History from Above: The Use of Oral History in Shaping Collective 
Memory in Singapore”, in Oral History and Public Memories, eds. Paula Hamilton, and Linda 
Shopes (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008), pp. 31-46.  
47 Daniel Chew, and Irene Lim eds., Sook Ching (Singapore: Oral History Department, 1992), 
pp. 16-18. See also Sidhu, The Bamboo Fortress, pp. 147-159.  
48 Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times 
Editions, 1998), p. 56. 
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him to return to collect his personal effects before boarding the military truck. 
Instead, he hid at the centre for two more days, and then “passed” the 




Fourthly, some Chinese survivors “passed” the Sook Ching screening as a 
result of pure luck. Lim Yew Hock, who was Singapore’s Chief Minister from 
1956 to 1959, devoted one chapter to the Japanese Occupation in his 
autobiography. In that chapter, he wrote that he was confined to a screening 
centre for three days. While he was fortunate that he “passed” the screening, 
after the Kempeitai merely confiscated his valuable belongings, some of his 
neighbours were not. He heard that the Japanese executed and buried them in 
the graves which they were forced to dig.
50
 He characterised the Sook Ching 
Massacre as “horror of the first magnitude”.51 Geoffrey Tan mentioned his 
cousin’s Sook Ching experience in his memoirs too. His cousin was at the 
Chinatown screening centre when the Japanese soldiers randomly placed him 
on a military truck and drove him to Fort Canning. He was then ordered to 
clear the ammunition that the British forces left behind. The Japanese 
subsequently released him which meant that he “passed” the screening.52 Tan 
alluded to his cousin’s good fortune when he wrote, “He could have ended up 
being shot at Changi beach, if he had been put in a different truck.”53          
 
                                                 
49 Ibid., p. 56. 
50 Lim Yew Hock, Reflections (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1986), p. 17. 
51 Ibid., p. 17. 
52 Geoffrey Tan, Escape from Battambang: A Personal World War II Experience (Singapore: 
Armour Publishing, 2001), pp. 13 and 16. 
53 Ibid., p. 16. 
82 
 
Fifthly, unlike the survivors mentioned in the preceding two paragraphs, eight-
year-old William Gwee and his family “passed” the Sook Ching screening 
neither because of wit nor luck, but because his father had worked in Japanese 
firms before the Pacific War. During the screening, the elder Gwee showed a 
Kempeitai officer the photographs that he took with his former Japanese 
superiors and colleagues. Being convinced that the Gwee family was not anti-
Japanese, the officer stamped the character “jian” on their arms and released 
them.
54
 William’s description of Sook Ching in his war memoirs is a unique 
case. Although it falls within the realm of official memories as he and his 
family “passed” the screening, his father’s pre-war association with the 
Japanese is rare among popular memories that overlap with official ones. The 
Singapore Story, which embodies the republic’s official memories, does not 
condone any discussion of Chinese civilians’ pre-1942 ties with the Japanese. 
Such discussion contradicts the state-sanctioned narrative of the local Chinese 
community’s active involvement in anti-Japanese activities before the Fall of 
Singapore, such as raising funds for the China Relief Fund and participating in 
the Dalforce’s armed resistance against the Japanese invaders.        
 
Sixthly, a handful of lucky Chinese civilians managed to escape unscathed 
from the Sook Ching screening centres. Lee Kip Lee dedicated an entire 
chapter of his memoirs to his nerve-wrecking experience at a screening centre 
located at the field of Telok Kurau English School. Being an English-educated 
college student, Lee was a likely Sook Ching target, along with his brother and 
his nephew. Fortunately for them, the Japanese soldier who was guarding 
                                                 
54 William Gwee Thian Hock, A Baba Boyhood: Growing Up during World War 2 (Singapore: 
Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2013), pp. 136-138. 
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them was nowhere to be seen by the evening. An Indian policeman 
subsequently released them, and they fled home. When he returned to his 
house at Amber Road, Lee heard gun shots which he assumed to be Japanese 
execution of Sook Ching victims at the nearby Katong beach.
55
 Ho See Beng 
also feared for the worst when Japanese soldiers forced him into a screening 
centre, so he quickly and safely made “a discreet exit” when the Kempeitai 
were not looking.
56
 Lee’s and Ho’s stories are two of the many local Chinese 
popular memories which overlap, or are even synonymous, with Singapore’s 
official memories of the Sook Ching Massacre.  
 
Popular Memories: Distinct from Official Memories  
The PAP government tends to cast popular memories of the Sook Ching 
Massacre into the above simplified and stereotypical categories that overlap 
with official memories. Nonetheless, there are many other types of popular 
memories that are more nuanced than, and are different from, state-endorsed 
ones. They are rarely mentioned in the Singapore Story because they do not 
coincide with the state’s emphasis on civilian victimisation by the Japanese 
occupiers. Yet these popular memories exist in the public domain. They are 
reflected in the autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, and published oral 
history interviews of Chinese war survivors who, for various reasons, did not 
report to the screening centres, were saved by compassionate Japanese officers, 
or had been exempted from the screening altogether. Others were too young to 
remember Sook Ching, while the rest chose not to mention the event in their 
                                                 
55 Lee Kip Lee, Amber Sands: A Boyhood Memoir (Singapore: Federal Publications, 1995), pp. 
122-135. 
56 Ramachandran Menon, Ho See Beng: The Washerwoman’s Son (Singapore: Straits Times 
Press, 2015), p. 29. 
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reminiscences because they wanted to forget their traumatic experiences, or 
because they had suffered memory loss owing to old age. As most of these 
survivors were spared from undergoing the ordeal of nearly losing their lives, 
or of losing their loved ones, their memories of the Sook Ching Massacre are 
merely one of the many episodes of their Japanese Occupation experiences. 
Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre which are distinct 
from official memories are illustrated in the following paragraphs. 
 
Foremost, a handful of Chinese civilians in Singapore made the bold decision 
not to report to the Sook Ching screening centres but safely hid elsewhere. 
Their experiences were similar to that of Ruth Ho whom I have mentioned in 
Chapter Two. In her autobiography, Jessie Chan recounted that she and her 
family had to report to New World Amusement Park which they thought was a 
household registration centre. Nevertheless, soon after leaving their home, her 
father had a premonition of worse things to come, and decided to return home 
instead as it was better for them to “die in our [sic] own house, not in a strange 
place”.57 Teenager Jessie was relived yet afraid, but her family managed to 
return and sought refuge in their home.
58
 Timothy Tow and his brother Tow 
Siang Hwa avoided going to the screening centre altogether by hiding in an 
inaccessible area in rural Singapore throughout Sook Ching.
59
 Both families 
were fortunate that the Kempeitai did not notice their absence from the 
screening centres. However, their memories are marginalised from the 
Singapore Story which highlights Chinese victimhood during Sook Ching, and 
                                                 
57 Jessie Chan Pearce, Ah Nya’s Story ([Canberra?]: [Jessie Chan Pearce?], 2011), p. 67. 
58 Ibid., pp. 66-67.  
59 Timothy Tow, Son of a Mother’s Vow (Singapore: Far Eastern Bible College Press 
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ignores the existence of civilians’ successful attempts to avoid the screening 
centres. 
 
Furthermore, a few war survivors avoided reporting to the Sook Ching 
screening centres by pure luck. In his memoirs, former colonial civil servant 
Quek Kok Chiang remembered falling sick during the period of Sook Ching. 
As he was recuperating in bed, a Japanese soldier came to his house to order 
all males to head to Beach Road. However, the soldier failed to notice him. 
Quek was hence spared from going to the screening centre. Had he reported 
there, he probably would have been executed. His illness was indeed a 
blessing in disguise.
60
 Goh Keng Swee, who later served as Singapore’s first 
Interior and Defence Minister, underwent a similar experience. Being a former 
member of the pro-British SSVF, he was a potential Sook Ching target. 
Fortunately, he forgot the date to report to the screening centre, and reported 
there the next day without being harmed. His friends who reported on the 
correct date were likely to have been killed.
61
 These memories shared by Quek 
and Goh are rarely known, but they reflect the diversity of Chinese popular 
memories of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore.         
 
Moreover, compassionate Japanese military officers saved several Chinese 
civilians from becoming Sook Ching victims. Former SSVF member Ee Peng 
Liang was arrested by the Kempeitai on 20 February 1942 which was the third 
day of the Sook Ching Massacre. Expecting to be killed, he volunteered to be 
                                                 
60 Quek Kiok Chiang, My Thanksgiving Testimonies (Singapore: Far Eastern Beacon Monthly, 
[2010?]), pp. 383-384.  




executed first. A Kempeitai officer admired Ee’s courage and released him, 
while his comrades who did not volunteer themselves were shot.
62
 Victor Seah, 
who was ten years old in 1942, and his fellow villagers in rural Ang Mo Kio 
were supposed to report to a screening centre at Sin Min High School, but the 
Japanese officer responsible for their neighbourhood exempted them from 
going out of goodwill.
63
 Nonetheless, these popular memories of kind-hearted 
Japanese soldiers are largely absent from the Singapore Story which 
perpetuates official memories of inhumane and ruthless Japanese soldiers 
instead. 
 
In addition, Chinese individuals whose services were of use to the Imperial 
Japanese Army were generally spared from the Sook Ching Massacre. The 
Kempeitai arrested former banker and SSVF officer Yap Pheng Geck and 
detained him for two weeks at their Tanjong Pagar office. During this period, 
Japanese soldiers took him to a screening centre at Tiong Bahru for two days, 
but they did not harm him. As the Japanese authorities valued his banking 
expertise, they ordered him to release blocked credits in local banks to 
jumpstart Syonan’s economy. As a result, they gave him an armband which 
exempted him from Sook Ching and protected him from Japanese brutality.
64
 
Chinese business leader Tan Siak Kew was likewise detained by the Japanese. 
In exchange for sparing his life, they forced him to join the collaborationist 
                                                 
62 Theresa Ee-Chooi, Father of Charity and… My Father (Singapore: SNP Publishing (Raffles 
Editions), 1997), pp. 100-102. 
63 Victor Seah Tiong Hin, A Life Worth Reliving (Singapore: Victor Seah Tiong Hin, 2002), pp. 
20, and 26-27. 
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Oversea Chinese Association (OCA).
65
 Besides businessmen, doctors, like He 
Wen-Lit, and farmers, such as Tang S.Y., were spared from undergoing the 
harrowing experiences of Sook Ching as the Japanese military needed them to 
run medical services and produce food respectively.
66
 Therefore, collaboration 
with the Japanese, not the Sook Ching Massacre, figures predominantly in the 
above recollections. Similar to popular memories of compassionate Japanese 
military officers, these Chinese popular memories of collaboration with the 
enemy are frowned upon and marginalised by Singapore’s official memories 
of the Japanese Occupation. 
 
However, some Chinese civilians who were young children during the 
Japanese Occupation did not remember the Sook Ching Massacre. As they 
were at least five years old in 1942, it is unlikely that they had no memories of 
the atrocities because of childhood amnesia which only affects children below 
the age of three.
67
 Thus, these young war survivors’ lack of memories of Sook 
Ching was possibly a result of them being shielded by their protective parents 
from witnessing or hearing about the massacre.
68
 For instance, six-year-old 
Ong Teng Cheong’s mother hid him and his siblings in a rubber factory 
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throughout the Sook Ching Massacre.
69
 Hence, his biography did not contain 
his personal memories of the event. Similarly, Alfred Wong, who was twelve 
years old in 1942, recalled in his oral history interview, which was published 
in 1996, that he “passed” the Sook Ching screening. However, he did not dwell 
on the episode and instead emphasised that he enjoyed his childhood during 
the Syonan years. Despite his parents’ fear of the Japanese, he was oblivious 
to the threats and dangers around him.
70
   
 
Finally, a group of war survivors did not mention their Sook Ching 
experiences in their writings, even though they were neither toddlers nor 
young children during the Japanese Occupation. One plausible reason is that 
their war experiences were so traumatic that they deliberately chose not to 
recall their memories. Alternatively, as their works were published several 
decades after the war, these ageing survivors’ memories might have faded to 
the extent that the degree of their agony and trauma associated with their war 
memories was lessened.
71
 Psychological research has proven that as people 
age, they suffer from memory loss due to neurological changes in the brain.
72
 
Therefore, elderly survivors might not feel the need to recall what they went 
through during the Sook Ching Massacre. For example, Lee Siew Mong wrote 
that he “suffered the same hardships” as those at the Sook Ching screening 
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 while Tan Chee Khoon depicted Singapore as being “fraught with 
danger” during Sook Ching.74 Both men’s descriptions of what they underwent 
during the massacre were very brief and ambiguous, but they devoted much 
space in their autobiographies to their lives after 1945. Other Chinese civilians 
factually described the Sook Ching Massacre from a third person perspective 
in their autobiographies and memoirs. They failed to account for their 
experiences during the atrocities, and they seemed to detach themselves 
personally from the event despite living in Singapore during that time.
75
 These 
cases show that the survivors’ experiences were either too distressing to 
remember that they concealed them, or that they had forgotten what they went 
through due to memory loss. 
 
Conclusion 
I have shown in this chapter that between 1980 and 2015, Singapore and Japan 
enjoyed cordial and growing relations, notwithstanding the development of 
diverse Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre. The “Learn 
from Japan” campaign during the 1980s was a high point in bilateral ties as 
Singapore sought Japanese expertise and assistance to raise its industrial 
productivity and build a knowledge-based economy. Both states have 
sustained their close economic and cultural ties even after the campaign ended 
by 1990. Although Singapore started to develop and promote official 
memories of Sook Ching and the Japanese Occupation in 1984 to inculcate 
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national belonging among Singaporeans, the PAP government did not allow 
these memories to affect its foreign policy towards Japan. Since then, more 
autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, and oral history interviews by Chinese 
war survivors who lived through the Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese 
Occupation were published. These first-hand accounts showed that popular 
memories of the atrocities are diverse. Some of these popular memories 
overlap with official memories of the atrocities and the Syonan period. They 
stress Japanese brutality and contain anti-Japanese sentiments. However, the 
rest of these popular memories are distinct from official memories as they 









The Nanjing Massacre in China and the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore 
were two major cases of atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army 
during the Fifteen-Year War. Popular memories of the respective massacre 
continue to resonate among the Chinese citizenry in China and Singapore in 
the seventy years after the conflict ended in 1945. Despite being 
predominantly ethnic Chinese societies and having enduring the brunt of 
Japanese aggression, Chinese civilians in China and Singapore have different 
popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre 
respectively. Therefore, in this study, I have addressed the extent to which the 
Chinese populace in China and Singapore remember the respective massacre 
from 1945 to 2015. I have also discussed the nature of the relationship 
between Chinese popular memories of each massacre and the corresponding 
official memories in China and Singapore. I have further analysed how and 
why China’s and Singapore’s domestic politics and foreign relations with 
post-war Japan between 1945 and 2015 shape Chinese popular memories of 
the respective massacre. I shall conclude this thesis by examining the 
differences between Chinese popular memories of both massacres, and explain 
the reasons for these differences.  
 
In addition, I have shown in this study that my contribution to the scholarly 
field of war memories in China and Singapore is to emphasise the importance 
of how popular memories are formed, and not simply what popular memories 
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are. My research has also built on and expanded from earlier research on the 
definitions and theories of popular memories, as well as on official memories 
of the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre. More importantly, I 
have provided a transnational and trans-regional perspective in understanding 
popular memories of both massacres through a comparative approach. 
 
Homogeneity versus Heterogeneity  
Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in China are more 
homogeneous than those of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore. Between 
1945 and 1982, popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre were uniformly 
marginalised by the Chinese state due to domestic and foreign considerations, 
such as the Maoist victor narrative and the global Cold War respectively. As a 
result of such “repressive erasure”, popular memories of the massacre became 
hardly visible in the public domain and were largely confined to the private 
realm. However, since 1982, as a result of the pervasive influence of official 
memories, popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in the PRC 
homogeneously contain strong anti-Japanese sentiments. In their published, 
state-sponsored oral history interviews and testimonies, massacre survivors 
recounted their harrowing encounters with the Japanese invaders, and the 
physical injuries and psychological trauma that they suffered as a result of the 
massacre. Even those who were barely a year old in 1937 were able to vividly 
and emotionally describe the wartime victimisation that their parents and other 
family members endured. It clearly reflects the intergenerational transmission 
of war memories from the older generation to the younger generation in China. 
The uniformity of popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre also explains 
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the success of the patriotic education campaign in promoting nationalism 
among Chinese youths which further results in them embracing popular anti-
Japanese nationalism. In addition, war survivors, despite having not lived in 
Nanjing in 1937, could even claim to “remember” the massacre, or recount 
Japanese atrocities in the city based on second-hand or third-hand knowledge. 
This proves that popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre are deeply 
embedded in Chinese society, and they echo the CCP government’s official 
memories of Chinese victimhood under Japanese imperialism.  
 
In contrast to the homogeneous popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in 
China, Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore 
have been heterogeneous in nature since 1945. From 1945 to 1980, the “blood 
debt” issue encouraged the growth of popular memories which stressed 
Japanese brutality and contained anti-Japanese emotions. However, as a likely 
result of the influence of Singapore’s post-war economic rapprochement with 
Japan during the same period, some of these Chinese popular memories did 
not reflect anti-Japanese sentiments as they focussed on the less brutal aspects 
of Sook Ching. Even after the PAP government developed official memories 
of the Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese Occupation in 1984, popular 
memories of Sook Ching continue to retain their diversity till today (2015). 
Some of these popular memories overlap with official memories by 
highlighting Japanese atrocities and expressing anti-Japanese feelings. 
Nevertheless, the rest of these popular memories are distinct from official 
memories. They avoid discussing the brutal aspects of Sook Ching and do not 
necessarily contain anti-Japanese feelings. These popular memories are 
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excluded from the Singapore Story because they do not coincide with the 
ruling party’s victimisation narrative of the Syonan years. 
 
Two explanations may be used to account for the differences in homogeneity 
between Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in China and 
those of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore. Firstly, the nature of the state 
shapes these memories. Popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre are largely 
homogeneous and dovetail with official memories due to the authoritarian 
nature of the CCP regime. The party-state does not tolerate alternative 
narratives of the massacre that challenge its version which emphasises Chinese 
victimhood and the death of 300,000 people under brutal Japanese militarism. 
In contrast, popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre are more 
heterogeneous and distinct from official memories owing to the democratic 
nature of the Singapore state. As Chinese Singaporeans are not obliged to 
accept the PAP government’s narrative of the massacre, various alternative 
types of popular memories have proliferated.  
 
Secondly, the socio-economic backgrounds and political loyalties played a 
role in influencing Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre and the 
Sook Ching Massacre. Those who had remained in Nanjing in 1937, and had 
experienced or witnessed the Japanese atrocities largely belonged to the lower 
socio-economic classes, such as peasants and labourers. Unlike the KMT elites 
and the upper classes, they might not have the means to flee when the 
Japanese military invaded the capital. Thus, they view and remember the 
Nanjing Massacre from a common perspective. Although Singapore is a 
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predominantly Chinese city, the Chinese population in 1942 was divided into 
disparate sub-groups, depending on individuals’ places of birth and their 
political loyalties. On the one hand, those who were China-born and Chinese-
educated were loyal to their motherland, and saw the Japanese Occupation in 
Singapore as an extension of the Second Sino-Japanese War. As a result, they 
are more likely to harbour anti-Japanese sentiments, and emphasise Japanese 
brutality in their memories of the Sook Ching Massacre.
1
 On the other hand, 
even though local-born and English-educated Peranakan Chinese
2
 shared the 
same culture as their China-born counterparts, they considered themselves as 
British subjects who were politically and emotionally detached from China. 
Thus, they were less emotional towards the Japanese, were more open to 
collaboration with them, and remember the Sook Ching Massacre in a more 
detached manner.
3
    
 
Symbolism of the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre 
The Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre occupy different 
positions in Chinese popular memories in China and Singapore respectively. 
The Nanjing Massacre has become an “incomparable and unforgettable” 
symbol in Chinese historical and national consciousness.
4
 In popular 
memories, which are largely shaped by the CCP regime’s official memories, it 
                                                 
1 The various Sook Ching survivors, whose personal recollections are recorded in Qu, Lunxian 
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2 They were Chinese who were born in Singapore or Malaya, and were descendants of inter-
marriages between Chinese immigrants and Malay women.  
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is representative of Chinese victimisation by Japanese imperialists during the 
War of Resistance. It has also formed a predominant and inalienable part of 
massacre survivors’ war memories, as shown in their published oral history 
testimonies and other first-hand accounts. On the contrary, despite its 
importance in Singapore’s official memories, the Sook Ching Massacre is not 
a major event in Chinese Singaporeans’ popular memories. The first-hand 
accounts of most survivors have indicated that the massacre is one of many 
episodes in their Japanese Occupation experiences, or even in their lifetimes. 
It is noteworthy that the results of a public survey conducted by Singapore’s 
Institute of Policy Studies in late 2014 revealed that the Japanese Occupation, 
not the Sook Ching Massacre in particular, was one of the ten most 
remembered historical events in Singapore.
5
 Whereas official memories 
influence popular memories in China and Singapore, there are nuances 
between official memories in both countries. For instance, the Nanjing 
Massacre Memorial Hall is dedicated solely to the victims of the massacre, but 
the Civilian War Memorial in Singapore commemorates not only Chinese 
victims of the Sook Ching Massacre, but also victims of all races who were 
killed by the Japanese military during the Syonan period. 
 
Influence of Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations with Japan 
Nonetheless, my study of the differences between Chinese popular memories 
of the Nanjing Massacre and those of the Sook Ching Massacre has revealed 
an area of similarity. Specifically, Chinese popular memories of both 
massacres are influenced by China’s and Singapore’s respective domestic 
                                                 




politics and their foreign relations with post-war Japan from 1945 to 2015. In 
China, popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre were marginalised between 
1945 and 1982 due to the Chinese Civil War, Mao Zedong’s heroic victor 
narrative, the global Cold War, and the CCP regime’s Japan-friendly foreign 
policy. After the outbreak of the Japanese history textbook controversy in 
1982, the Communist party-state revived both official and popular memories 
of the Nanjing Massacre. Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin manipulated these 
memories to promote Chinese nationalism and strengthen their party’s 
political legitimacy as Marxism lost credibility domestically and 
internationally in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They introduced the patriotic 
education campaign which emphasised Chinese suffering during the Nanjing 
Massacre which in turn, has given rise to anti-Japanese nationalism among the 
Chinese masses. Worsening Sino-Japanese tensions since 1982, such as 
Chinese opposition to Japan’s reluctance to acknowledge its wartime past has 
further inflamed popular nationalism in the PRC. Such anti-Japanese 
nationalism has entrenched Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing 
Massacre till today (2015). 
 
Similarly, Singapore’s domestic politics and its foreign relations with Japan 
between 1945 and 2015 have shaped Chinese popular memories of the Sook 
Ching Massacre. The “blood debt” issue and the PAP government’s demands 
for war reparations from Japan led to the growth of popular memories of Sook 
Ching from 1945 to 1980. These memories largely expressed strong anti-
Japanese feelings. However, Singapore’s concurrent courting of Japanese 
investments and technical know-how to develop its nascent industrial 
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economy brought about the development of popular memories which did not 
necessarily contain anti-Japanese emotions. Since 1984, the PAP 
administration has been relying on official memories of the Sook Ching 
Massacre and the Japanese Occupation, as well as on popular memories which 
overlap with official memories, to promote nation-building and instil a sense 
of national identity among Singaporeans. At the same time, the ruling party is 
confident that these memories of Chinese Singaporeans’ wartime victimhood 
do not complicate the city-state’s bilateral relations with Japan. The “Learn 
from Japan” campaign between 1980 and 1990 further enhanced Singapore-
Japan ties and helped to reduce anti-Japanese sentiments in Chinese popular 
memories of the Sook Ching Massacre. These memories have also portrayed 
the massacre and the Syonan years in a less emotional but more detached 
manner.       
 
While it may be argued that this thesis has neglected the study of social factors 
that may influence popular memories, such as race, religion, and culture, I 
have shown that domestic politics and international relations are important 
factors in the shaping of Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre 
in China and the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore.  In order to create a sense 
of national identity among their citizens, both states manipulate memories of 
the past to promote nationalism and nation-building. In an increasingly 
interconnected Asian community of nations, China and Singapore also have 
interlocking diplomatic and economic relations with Japan. As a result, their 
domestic politics and bilateral ties with Japan shape both official memories 
and popular memories of the respective massacre. Owing to the strong 
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influence of domestic politics and foreign relations in China and Singapore, 
official memories shape popular memories too. This has led to the blurring of 
the distinction between both types of memories in the two countries. 
 
In summary, the above comparison has revealed that Chinese popular 
memories of the Nanjing Massacre in China are more homogenous than those 
of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore. Furthermore, the Nanjing Massacre 
and the Sook Ching Massacre are symbolically different in Chinese popular 
memories in China and Singapore respectively. However, in both China and 
Singapore, domestic politics and foreign relations with post-war Japan from 
1945 to 2015 are common factors that have shaped popular memories of the 
Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre respectively. Hence, Chinese 
popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre are 
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LIST OF FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS ON THE  
SOOK CHING MASSACRE 
(Note:  
1. This is not an exhaustive list which includes autobiographies, 
biographies, memoirs, and published oral history interviews and 
testimonies that are not stated in the Bibliography. Some of these first-
hand accounts also discuss the Japanese Occupation of Singapore and 
nation-building in post-war Singapore. 
2. All the first-hand accounts listed in this Appendix are categorised 
according to their respective year of publication, as stated in Table 1 
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